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Abstract
Blockchain protocols exchange payment transactions se-
curely, but their performance is limited by the need to achieve
global consensus. Payment networks, as a second layer on
top of blockchains, allow more efficient payments between
parties. Existing payment networks, however, are fundamen-
tally insecure: they assume synchronous blockchain access,
i.e. that participants can write transactions to the blockchain
within bounded time. As shown recently, attackers can delay
transactions with current blockchains, which only offer best-
effort write latencies, and thus steal funds.
We describe Teechain, the first layer-two payment network
that only requires asynchronous blockchain access. Teechain
exploits trusted execution environments (TEEs) in modern
CPUs: Teechain constructs a decentralised network of TEEs
and uses TEEs to secure collateral funds in payment chan-
nels without further interaction with the blockchain. Since
TEEs provide no availability guarantees and may be com-
promised themselves, Teechain mitigates against Byzantine
TEE failures through a novel combination of chain replica-
tion and threshold secret sharing. Teechain achieves at least
33× higher transaction throughput than the Lightning Net-
work with similar latencies, while placing 75% fewer trans-
actions on the blockchain in the common case. A Teechain
deployment with 30 machines can handle over 1 million Bit-
coin transactions per second.
1 Introduction
Cryptocurrencies [46, 70, 51, 53] enable secure transactions
between participants using blockchain protocols. Current
blockchain protocols have limited performance due to their
need to achieve consensus for all transactions. For example,
global throughput in Bitcoin [46] and Ethereum [70] is capped
at a handful of transactions per second, and transactions take
minutes or hours to be committed. Payment networks [21, 15,
50] have been proposed as a more performant second layer
on top of the blockchain. They execute transactions off-chain,
without writing to the underlying blockchain for every trans-
action, thus enabling much higher transaction throughput.
Existing payment network protocols [15, 50, 9], however,
are fundamentally insecure: they assume synchronous block-
chain access under which participants must be able to write
transactions to the blockchain within a bounded period of
time τ . This makes these protocols vulnerable to attack:
blockchains do not guarantee bounded write latencies, and
transaction can be delayed by attackers, as demonstrated by re-
cent attacks [54, 58, 27, 7, 29, 16, 28]. Existing payment net-
work protocols therefore trade-off safety and liveness: funds
are locked in escrow on the underlying blockchain during τ .
If τ is small to reduce fund lock times, an attacker can more
easily delay transactions to steal funds; if τ is large to make
attacks more expensive, funds are inaccessible and unusable
for longer periods of time.
We present Teechain, a new payment network that supports
secure fund transfers on top of existing blockchains while
requiring only asynchronous blockchain access. In contrast
to existing proposals, Teechain makes no assumptions about
bounded transaction write times to the blockchain, thus avoid-
ing the trade-off between fund safety and liveness.
To achieve asynchronous blockchain access, Teechain ex-
ploits the support for trusted execution environments (TEEs)
in commodity CPUs [23, 4]. TEEs are a hardware security
feature that protects the confidentiality and integrity of code
and data. Teechain uses TEEs to manage the funds in the pay-
ment network: it constructs a peer-to-peer decentralized net-
work of TEEs, and assigns funds and balances across pay-
ment channels. As existing TEE implementations are vulnera-
ble to compromise [67, 8, 45], Teechain assumes a Byzantine
failure model for TEEs. It uses a chain replication scheme
combined with threshold secret sharing to be resilient against
individual TEE compromises.
The design of Teechain makes three contributions:
(C1) Asynchronous blockchain access. Teechain is the first
payment network to operate with asynchronous blockchain
access. It comprises two protocols: (i) a protocol for point-
to-point payment channels in which two participants can ex-
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change funds; and (ii) a protocol for multi-hop payments that
offers payments along paths of payment channels. As TEEs
manage fund balances, Teechain achieves high transaction
throughput and low latency by executing transactions as sin-
gle message exchanges—unlike existing solutions.
(C2) Dynamic deposit assignment. Teechain decouples the
creation of fund deposits from payment channel establishment.
As deposits are secured by TEEs, participants can create de-
posits in advance, dynamically assign them to channels upon
establishment, and move them in and out of channels at run-
time. Since deposit assignment does not require blockchain
access, payment channels are established within seconds.
(C3) Chain replication and threshold signatures. To repli-
cate the in-memory TEE state, Teechain uses force-freeze
chain replication, a new variant of chain replication that
achieves high availability and strong consistency, while pre-
venting roll-back and forking attacks. To account for TEE
compromises [67], Teechain assumes a Byzantine failure
model for TEEs. After partitioning the state across multiple
TEEs, it tolerates Byzantine failures by exploiting multisigna-
ture support of the underlying blockchain. To access funds, a
sufficient number of TEE signatures are required.
We implement Teechain using Intel’s SGX TEEs [22] and
deploy it on the Bitcoin network.1 In addition to supporting
asynchronous blockchain access, Teechain performs signifi-
cantly better than existing solutions: channel establishment
takes seconds, as opposed to minutes or hours with previous
solutions [15, 50]. Compared to the Lightning Network [37],
Teechain with two replicas achieves at least 33× higher trans-
action throughput with similar latencies, while placing fewer
transactions on the underlying blockchain.
2 Secure Payment Networks for Blockchains
2.1 Blockchain protocols
In comparison to earlier payment systems [48, 69, 2], block-
chain protocols, such as Bitcoin [46] and Ethereum [63], are
not operated by a central trusted entity; instead they exe-
cute a peer-to-peer replicated state machine that maintains
an append-only ledger containing the history of all payment
transactions in the network.
As blockchain protocols must achieve consensus over the
order of all transactions in the ledger, their throughput is lim-
ited. Past work tries to address their performance limitations,
from alternatives to the chain structure [36, 63, 56] to differ-
ent block generation techniques [17, 33, 47]; others [42, 44,
18, 59] build on classical consensus protocols [13] or operate
in permissioned settings [10, 20]. While all these proposals
improve performance, none can reach the performance of di-
rect payments that do not require global consensus.
1An alpha release of Teechain can be found at: redacted for anonymity
2.2 Payment channels and networks
Payment channels [38, 43, 49, 15, 50] overcome the perfor-
mance limitations of blockchains by allowing parties to ex-
change funds directly, off-chain, without having to use the
blockchain for each transaction. Instead, transactions become
message exchanges in which parties update the balances, or
state, of the payment channel directly. Payment networks [50,
65, 40] chain multiple channels together to create multi-hop
payment paths between parties that do not have a direct pay-
ment channel. This is necessary to support e-commerce sce-
narios in which buyers and sellers conduct transactions via in-
termediaries [1]. To prevent fund loss or theft, all channels in
the path must update their balances in unison. Payment net-
works solve this by freezing funds during payment routing
and monitoring the blockchain, which prevents other users
from terminating channels freely [50].
Existing payment networks, however, assume synchronous
blockchain access—users must be able to write transactions
to the blockchain within a bounded period of time, τ . This is
to prevent old and stale channel states from being published
on the blockchain to steal funds. For example, in Duplex Mi-
cropayment Channels [15], time-locked transactions prevent
older channel states from published before newer ones; in the
Lightning Network [50], users monitor the blockchain for old
states, and if found, have a bounded amount of time to react.
Blockchain protocols, however, fail to bound write laten-
cies: transactions can be delayed with little cost, as shown by
recent attacks [58, 27, 29, 16, 28, 54], making existing pay-
ment networks vulnerable to attack. When payment chan-
nels lock channel funds in escrow on the underlying block-
chain [38, 15, 50, 43] during the synchronous time period, τ ,
there is a trade-off between security and liveness: if τ is small
to reduce lock times, an attacker can more easily delay trans-
actions to steal funds; if τ is large to make attacks more ex-
pensive, funds are inaccessible for larger periods of time.
Existing payment networks also suffer from long chan-
nel establishment times, and lack the ability to add and re-
move funds from payment channels dynamically [38, 50, 15].
While it is possible to redistribute funds between static groups
of payment channels [9], this limits fund redistribution to a
fixed group of collaborating participants. REVIVE [32] rebal-
ances payment channels by sending payments along cycles
in a payment network but relies on synchronous blockchain
access and locks funds statically to channels; Sprites [43] can
add and remove funds to and from channels dynamically, but
requires on-chain support for complex transaction constructs,
which is incompatible with blockchains such as Bitcoin.
2.3 Trusted hardware and blockchains
Trusted execution environments (TEEs) [23, 4, 30, 31] have
been used to improve the security and performance of block-
chain protocols. TEEs provide confidentiality and integrity
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Figure 1: Overview of the Teechain network
guarantees to code and data in a system, as long as the physi-
cal CPU is not breached. TEEs typically also support remote
attestation [26, 24], which allows remote parties to verify that
a certain piece of software is running within a genuine TEE.
Existing TEE implementations are vulnerable to side-channel
attacks [8, 45], and thus TEE compromises are possible [67].
Tesseract [6] constructs a secure cryptocurrency exchange
but is incompatible with payment networks. Other work fo-
cuses on the use of TEEs for smart contracts: TownCrier
enables a secure data-feed for blockchain contracts [72],
Ekiden [14] offers a platform for privacy preserving smart
contracts; Obscuro constructs a secure Bitcoin mixer using
TEEs [66]; TEEChan [38] uses TEEs to realize single-hop
payment channels with limited lifetimes. It provides limited
fault tolerance, requires synchronous blockchain access, does
not support multi-hop payments, and cannot create payment
channels instantly or dynamically assign deposits.
2.4 Threat model and problem statement
We assume a scenario in which mutually distrusting parties
use a blockchain-based cryptocurrency to exchange funds.
Parties are selfish and potentially malicious, i.e. if it benefits
them, they may attempt to steal funds and deviate from the
protocol. Parties may drop, send, record, modify, and replay
messages. Parties may also collude with one another. The
parties are connected via a network, with some parties behind
firewalls or network address translation (NAT).
Our goal is to design an off-chain payment network that
achieves high transaction throughput for secure multi-hop
payments, while assuming asynchronous access to the under-
lying blockchain and Byzantine failures of all participants.
3 Teechain Overview
We provide an overview of Teechain. Teechain constructs a
peer-to-peer payment network using TEEs. Funds in Teechain
are controlled and managed by the TEEs and distributed
across payment channels. As shown in Fig. 1, participants,
such as Alice and Bob, operate local TEEs (TEEA and TEEB)
that execute the Teechain protocols. Users without a local
TEE, such as Dave, can use a remote TEE to manage funds.
Payment channels and multi-hop payments. Teechain
forms bidirectional payment channels between TEEs with di-
rect network connectivity. This enables two participants to
exchange funds (e.g. Fig. 1, channel C1 between Alice and
Bob). Teechain channels operates with asynchronous block-
chain access: whenever a channel is terminated, only a single
blockchain transaction for the final state of the channel is gen-
erated, avoiding the need to invalidate old transactions on the
blockchain. We describe the payment channel protocol in §4.
Teechain also supports multi-hop payments by chaining
multiple payment channels together, forming an indirect path
for the exchange of funds. Fig. 1 shows a multi-hop payment
with Alice paying Carol via Bob using path C1–C2. Multi-
hop payments are composed of at least two payment channels,
and ensure all channels in the path update together.2 We
describe the multi-hop payment protocol in §5.
Deposit creation and association. Funds can be added and
removed from Teechain dynamically by creating and releas-
ing fund deposits. Deposits are controlled by the TEEs in
the network and created through transactions that spend into
cryptocurrency addresses where the private keys for those
addresses are secured by TEEs (e.g. TEEA contains two de-
posits, D1 and D2, and secures the private key kA). Each de-
posit is placed on the blockchain and pays into an m-out-of-n
multisignature address: these are cryptocurrency addresses
owned by n participants that require only m signatures to
spend from [62]. D1, for example, pays 1000 units of cryp-
tocurrency into a 2-out-of-4 multisignature address where the
4 cryptocurrency addresses are owned by the private keys of
TEEA, TEEE, TEEF and TEEG, and 2 signatures from those
4 TEEs are required to spend D1.
Deposit creation is decoupled from payment channel in-
2Finding routes within the Teechain network is outside the scope of this
paper. We assume participants determine paths out-of-band.
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stantiation. Participants can associate deposits with channels
dynamically to increase their balances. Since deposit associ-
ation does not require blockchain access, payment channels
can be established with low latency (see §7). Fig. 1 shows
channel C1 containing deposits D1 and D2 from Alice, and de-
posit D3 from Bob. Some deposits may be unassociated with
any channel (e.g. D5) and can be released from the network
upon request. §4 describes deposit creation and association.
Committee chains. As TEEs in Teechain control funds in
volatile memory, crash failures can lead to fund loss, and TEE
compromises [67] can lead to fund theft. To overcome crash
and Byzantine failures, Teechain constructs committee chains
that secure deposits and replicate deposit state in the network.
Committee chains consist of replication chains of TEEs where
the committee members control the private keys for a deposit
(e.g. TEEA has a committee chain with 3 other TEEs that
replicate deposit states D1 and D2). Teechain uses monetary
incentives to motivate committee participation. For each
payment, committee members takes a small, configurable fee.
This enables Teechain to tolerate threshold TEE compromises.
We describe committee chains in §6.
TEE outsourcing. Users without a local TEE (e.g.Dave,
Fig. 1), may participate in Teechain through TEE outsourc-
ing: using a remote TEE in the network as a local TEE. For
this, the user attests a remote TEE and provisions it with a
shared secret key, giving them the same abilities as a local
TEE user. To prevent having to trust remote TEE operators,
Teechain (i) constructs committee chains using other TEEs;
and (ii) uses monetary incentives to motivate availability.
4 Teechain payment channels
Teechain forms bidirectional payment channels using TEEs
to allow participants to exchange funds directly. Teechain
delegates fund ownership to the TEEs in the network through
fund deposits. Participants instruct their TEEs to establish
payment channels, associate funds with channels, execute
payments, and terminate channels by generating settlement
transactions for the blockchain.
Due to memory limitations of existing TEEs [22], Teechain
does not maintain the complete blockchain in the TEE. As
such, TEEs have no direct way of verifying transactions. Par-
ticipants must therefore interact with the blockchain in four
cases: (i) when funds are deposited into the network; (ii) when
funds are released from the network; (iii) when a new deposit
is approved and assigned to a channel; and (iv) when pay-
ment channels are terminated. In each case, interaction oc-
curs without assuming bounded blockchain latencies.
4.1 Payment channel protocol
We present the Teechain payment channel protocol in Alg. 1.
Immediate payment channel creation. Teechain allows
payment channels to be created without blockchain in-
teraction. To construct a payment channel, first, a se-
cure network channel is established between two TEEs
(newNetworkChannel, Alg. 1, line 15) using authenticated
Diffie-Hellman [34] to provision keys (line 17); remote attes-
tation ensures TEE validity. Authentication occurs through
a unique public/private key pair generated securely by each
TEE (line 1)—keys are exchanged out-of-band. Authentica-
tion in this manner prevents messages from being shared be-
tween multiple TEEs, avoiding state-forking attacks in which
attackers maintain multiple different TEE states by forking
and withholding messages.
Using the secure network channel, payment channels can
be created. Both participants provide their TEEs with the re-
mote public key and a cryptocurrency settlement address, i.e.
an address to be paid upon channel settlement and deposit re-
turn (newPayChannel, line 18). The TEEs then associate this
information with the channel and create a signed acknowl-
edgement message (line 26), opening the channel (line 27).
Dynamic deposit assignment. Teechain allows funds to
be associated/dissociated with payment channels at runtime.
A deposit is a transaction, txo, placed on the blockchain
that spends funds into an m-out-of-n address, where the n
addresses are TEE-owned address returned by command
newAddr (line 32). For simplicity, Alg. 1 constrains deposits
to be paid into 1-out-of-1 multisignature addresses. We out-
line the protocol for general m-out-of-n deposits in §6.1.
New deposits can be added at any time (newDeposit,
line 36). The corresponding private keys to spend deposits
are stored in the TEEs (line 34), allowing the funds to be re-
leased later (releaseDeposit, line 42). Before a deposit can
be associated with a channel, the remote party must approve
it (approveMyDeposit, line 48). Deposit approval allows par-
ticipants to define the security parameters of their channels,
i.e. how many transaction confirmations they require. Partici-
pants can validate other deposits in the network (line 58) and
notify TEEs of deposit approval (line 59). Deposits only need
to be approved once for each participant pair, and can be cre-
ated and approved in advance of payment channel creation.
Unassociated deposits can be associated with a payment
channel (associateMyDeposit, line 64). Channel balances are
updated (line 70 and line 79) and the corresponding private
key is shared with the remote TEE (line 73), enabling the re-
mote to spend the deposit upon channel termination (line 72).
Deposit dissociation works similarly (dissociateDeposit,
line 90). To prevent double-spending, dissociation requires
the remote TEE to acknowledge the request first (line 99) and
to destroy its copy of the private key (line 104).
Payment deposit rebalancing. If balances permit, partici-
pants can execute payments. Command pay (line 82) updates
channel balances locally and notifies the remote (line 86) to
update its balance (line 87). Teechain allows deposit rebal-
ancing to reduce collateral fund lock-in. For example, assum-
ing a channel c with deposit d1 of value v1, after payments of
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Algorithm 1: Teechain payment channel protocol (For brevity, we constrain deposits to be paid into 1-out-of-1 multisignature addresses; §6.1
outlines the protocol for general m-out-of-n deposits. We omit freshness protection of messages.)
1 (Kme,kme)← generate public, private keys
2 ∀K ∶ netaes(K) =⊥ /* AES keys for network channels */
3 ∀id ∶ cremote K(id) =⊥ /* Remote pub keys */
4 ∀id ∶ cis open(id) = False /* Pay chans closed */
5 ∀id ∶ cmy deps(id) =⊥ /* My deposits in pay chan */
6 ∀id ∶ cremote deps(id) =⊥ /* Remote deps in pay chan */
7 ∀id ∶ cmy bal(id) =⊥ /* My bal in pay chan */
8 ∀id ∶ cremote bal(id) =⊥ /* Remote bal in pay chan */
9 ∀id ∶ cmy add(id) =⊥ /* My Bitcoin addresses */
10 ∀id ∶ cremote add(id) =⊥ /* Remote Bitcoin addresses */
11 ∀tx ∶ allDeps(tx) =⊥ /* All tx output deposits */
12 ∀tx ∶ freeDeps(tx) =⊥ /* Unassociated deposits */
13 ∀K ∶ appDeps(K) =⊥ /* Remote approved deps */
14 ∀abtc ∶ btcPrivs(abtc) =⊥ /* Btc private keys */
15 on newNetworkChannel(Kremote)
16 assert netaes(Kremote) =⊥
17 netaes(Kremote)← remote attestation and
authenticated Diffie-Hellman using Kremote
18 on newPayChannel(id,Kremote,aremotebtc ,amebtc)
19 assert cremote K(id) =⊥
20 cremote K(id)← Kremote
21 cmy add(id)← amebtc
22 cremote add(id)← aremotebtc
23 cmy bal(id)← 0
24 cremote bal(id)← 0
25 cis open(id)← False
26 return (newChannelAck, id,amebtc,aremotebtc ) signed by
kme
27 on receive (newChannelAck, id,aremotebtc ,amebtc) signed by
k for cremote K (id)
28 assert cis open(id) = False
29 assert cmy add(id) = amebtc
30 assert cremote add(id) = aremotebtc
31 cis open(id)← True
32 on newAddr()
33 (abtc,kbtc)← new Bitcoin address and private key
34 btcPrivs(abtc)← kbtc
35 return abtc
36 on newDeposit(txo,abtc)
37 assert btcPrivs(abtc) exists
38 assert txo /∈ allDeps /* can’t add same dep twice */
39 assert txo.btcAddress = abtc /* verify txo */
40 allDeps← allDeps∪ {txo}
41 freeDeps← freeDeps∪ {txo}
42 on releaseDeposit(txo,abtc)
43 assert txo ∈ freeDeps /* verify deposit is free */
44 assert btcPrivs(txo.bitcoinAddress) exists
45 tx← generate tx spending txo into abtc using
btcPrivs(txo.btcAddress)
46 freeDeps← freeDeps\ {txo}
47 return tx
48 on approveMyDeposit(Kremote, txo)
49 assert netaes(Kremote) exists
50 assert txo ∈ freeDeps
51 assert txo /∈ appDeps(Kremote)
52 return (approveMyDeposit,Kme, txo) signed by kme.
53 on receive (approveMyDeposit,Kremote, txo) signed
by k for Kremote
54 assert netaes(Kremote) exists
55 assert txo /∈ appDeps(Kremote)
56 Verify that txo is in the blockchain
57 appDeps(Kremote)← appDeps(Kremote)∪ {txo}
58 return (approvedDeposit,Kme, txo) signed using
kme
59 on receive(approvedDeposit,Kremote, txo)) signed by
k for Kremote
60 assert netaes(Kremote) exists
61 assert txo ∈ freeDeps
62 assert txo /∈ appDeps(Kremote)
63 appDeps(Kremote)← appDeps(Kremote)∪ {txo}
64 on associateMyDeposit(id, txo)
65 assert cis open(id) = True
66 assert txo ∈ appDeps(cremote K(id))
67 assert txo ∈ freeDeps
68 freeDeps← freeDeps\ {txo}
69 cmy deps(id)← cmy deps(id)∪ {txo}
70 cmy bal(id)← cmy bal(id)+ txo.amount
71 Kremote ← cremote K(id)
72 kencbtc ← btcPrivs(txo.btcAddress) encrypted under
netaes(Kremote)
73 return (associatedDeposit, id, txo,kencbtc ) signed
using kme
74 on receive(associatedDeposit, id, txo,kencbtc ) signed
by k for cremote K (id)
75 assert cis open(id) = True
76 assert txo ∈ appDeps(cremote K(id))
77 cremote deps(id)← cremote deps(id)∪ {txo}
78 cremote bal(id)← cremote bal(id)+ txo.amount
79 Kremote ← cremote K(id)
80 kbtc ← k
enc
btc decrypted under netaes(Kremote)
81 btcPrivs(txo.btcAddress)← kbtc
82 on pay(id,amount)
83 assert cmy bal(id) ≥ amount
84 cmy bal(id)← cmy bal(id)−amount
85 cremote bal(id)← cremote bal(id)+amount
86 return (paid, id,amount) signed using kme
87 on receive(paid, id,amount) signed by k for
cremote K (id)
88 cmy bal(id)← cmy bal(id)+amount
89 cremote bal(id)← cremote bal(id)−amount
90 on dissociateDeposit(id, txo)
91 assert txo ∈ cmy deps(id)
92 assert cmy bal(id) ≥ txo.amount
93 return (dissociatedDeposit, id, txo) signed
using kme
94 on receive (dissociatedDeposit, id, txo)
signed by k for cremote K (id)
95 assert txo ∈ cremote deps(id)
96 assert cremote bal(id) ≥ txo.amount
97 cremote deps(id)← cremote deps(id) \ {txo}
98 cremote bal(id)← cremote bal(id)− txo
99 return (dissociatedDepositAck, id, txo)
signed using kme
100 on receive (dissociatedDepositAck, id, txo)
signed by k for cremote K (id)
101 cmy deps(pubKey)← cmy deps(pubKey) \ {txo}
102 cmy bal(id)← cmy bal(id)− txo
103 freeDeps← freeDeps∪ {txo}
104 btcPrivs(txo.btcAddress)←⊥
105 on settle(id)
106 if cmy bal(id) =∑n1 (cmy deps(id).amount)∧
cremote bal(id) =∑n′1 (cremote deps(id).amount)) then
107 ∀tx in cmy deps(id) ∶ dissociateDeposit(tx)
108 Notify remote to dissociate all deposits.
109 if cmy deps(id) =⊥∧ cremote deps(id) =⊥ then
110 /* Remote dissociated deps.
111 Terminate off-chain. */
112 ∀i ∶ ci(id)←⊥ /* Reset all channel state */
113 else
114 allDepAddrs ← ∀tx in (cmy deps(id)∪
cremote deps(id)) ∶ return tx.btcAddress
115 tx← generate signed txo spending:
116 cmy bal (id) into cmy add (id) &
117 cremote bal (id) into cremote add (id) using:
118 btcPrivs(allDepAddrs)
119 ∀i ∶ ci(id)←⊥ /* Reset all channel state */
120 Notify remote that I terminated.
121 return tx
value p1 have been made, the free collateral is v1−p1=x1. If
x1 is large, there is a high collateral lock-in. To avoid this, a
participant can associate another deposit d2 of value v2, where
v1>v2>p1, with c and dissociate d1 from c, reducing the col-
lateral lock-in. If the participant requires access to d1, the de-
posit can be released, or assigned to a different channel.
Off/on-chain channel termination. At any time, either
party may settle payment channels (settle, line 105). If the
balances of the parties are neutral i.e. equivalent to their de-
posits as though no payments have been made, Teechain can
terminate the channel off-chain, by simply disassociating the
deposits (line 107). Off-chain termination allows the funds to
become available immediately, with fewer transactions placed
onto the blockchain (see §7.5); otherwise, a settlement trans-
action is returned (line 115).
5 Teechain multi-hop payments
Teechain supports multi-hop payments along paths of pay-
ment channels in the network. To prevent fund loss, all
channels in the path must update their balances consistently.
Teechain achieves this without assuming synchronous block-
chain access or freezing payment channels to prevent settle-
ment. Instead, Teechain introduces proofs of premature ter-
mination (PoPTs)—if a participant prematurely terminates a
channel during a multi-hop payment, all other participants in
the path present their TEE with a PoPT to determine the state
at which termination occurred.
If a multi-hop payment executes successfully, participants
do not need to interact with the blockchain. Blockchain inter-
action is only required if a participant terminates a channel
prematurely. In this case, the TEEs in the path authorize the
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Algorithm 2: Teechain multi-hop payment protocol execution at TEE pi (For brevity, we omit encryption, integrity and freshness
protection of messages. TEEs in the path are numbered 1 . . .n. Overlined variables are signed by the corresponding private key. ⊥ represents null.)
1 τ i ←⊥
2 amnti ←⊥
3 on payMultihop (amount,p1, ... ,pn)
4 send (p1, lock,amount,p1, ... ,pn,τ())
5 on receive (lock,amount,
p1, ... ,pn,τ(p1, ... ,pi−1))
6 assert cstage⟨pi ,pi+1⟩ = idle
7 assert cmyBal⟨pi ,pi+1⟩ ≥ amount
8 amnti ← amount
9 if i < n then
10 cstage⟨pi ,pi+1⟩ ← lock
11 send (pi+1,lock, p1, ... ,pn,τ
(p1, ... ,pi))
12 else /* i == n */
13 cstage⟨pn−1 ,pn⟩ ← sign
14 send (pn−1,sign,τ(p1, ... ,pn−1,pn))
15 on receive
(sign,τ(p1, ... ,pi,pi+1, ... ,pn))
16 assert cstage⟨pi ,pi+1⟩ = lock
17 if i > 1 then
18 cstage⟨pi ,pi+1⟩ ← sign
19 send (pi−1,sign, τ (p1, ... ,pi−1,
pi, ... ,pn))
20 else /* i == 1 */
21 τ1 ← τ(p1, ... ,pn)
22 cstage⟨p1 ,p2⟩ ← preUpdate
23 send (p2,preUpdate,τ1))
24 on receive (preUpdate,τ)
25 assert cstage⟨pi ,pi+1⟩ = sign
26 τ i ← τ
27 if i < n then
28 cstage⟨pi ,pi+1⟩ ← preUpdate
29 send (pi+1,preUpdate,τ).
30 else /* i == n */
31 cstage⟨pn−1 ,pn⟩ ← update
32 cmyBal⟨pn ,pn−1⟩ ← cmyBal⟨pn ,pn−1⟩ +amnti
33 send (pn−1,update)
34 on receive (update)
35 assert cstage⟨pi ,pi+1⟩ = preUpdate
36 if i > 1 then
37 cstage⟨pi ,pi+1⟩ ← update
38 cmyBal⟨pi ,pi+1⟩ ← cmyBal⟨pi ,pi+1⟩ +amnti
39 cmyBal⟨pi ,pi−1⟩ ← cmyBal⟨pi ,pi−1⟩ −amnti
40 send (pi−1,update)
41 else /* i == 1 */
42 τ1 ←⊥
43 cstage⟨p1 ,p2⟩ ← postUpdate
44 send (p2,postUpdate)
45
46 on receive (postUpdate)
47 assert cstage⟨pi ,pi+1⟩ = update
48 if i < n then
49 τ i ←⊥
50 cstage⟨pi ,pi+1⟩ ← postUpdate
51 send (pi+1,postUpdate)
52 else /* i == n */
53 cstage⟨pn−1 ,pn⟩ ← idle
54 send (pn−1, release)
55 on receive (release)
56 assert cstage⟨pi ,pi+1⟩ = postUpdate
57 cstage⟨pi ,pi+1⟩ ← idle
58 if i > 1 then
59 send (pi−1, release)
60 on eject
61 s← cstage⟨pi ,pi+1⟩
62 cstage⟨pi ,pi+1⟩ ← terminated
63 if s = lock ∨ s = sign ∨ s =
postUpdate ∨ s = release then
64 return ccurrent tx⟨pi−1 ,pi⟩ and ccurrent tx⟨pi ,pi+1⟩
65 return τ
66 on eject(popt)
67 s← cstage⟨pi ,pi+1⟩
68 cstage⟨pi ,pi+1⟩ ← terminated
69 if popt = lock ∨ popt = sign then
70 return cpre pay tx⟨pi−1 ,pi⟩ and cpre pay tx⟨pi ,pi+1⟩
71 else if popt = postUpdate ∨
popt = release then
72 return cpost pay tx⟨pi−1 ,pi⟩ and cpost pay tx⟨pi ,pi+1⟩
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Lock Lock
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Figure 2: Overview of multi-hop payment protocol
generation of settlement transactions consistent with those
of the prematurely terminated channel using PoPTs. As mul-
tiple settlement transactions may be generated for the same
channel by different participants, Teechain generates conflict-
ing blockchain transactions to ensure consistent termination
states for all channels.
5.1 Multi-hop payment protocol
Fig. 2 shows the messages exchanged between TEEs when
Alice routes a payment to Bob via Payment Processor. Alg. 2
describes the protocol executed at each TEE. To issue the
payment, Alice executes payMultihop (Alg. 2, line 3), lock-
ing the payment channels in the path by forwarding a lock re-
quest along the channels (Fig. 2, stage 1 and Alg. 2, line 5).
Channel locks prevent channels from being used for other
payments and ensure sufficient balances. The TEEs in the
path then update all channel states from pre-payment to post-
payment state (Fig. 2, stages 2–5 and Alg. 2, line 15–line 54).
Once all payment channels are updated, the channel locks are
released (Fig. 2, stage 6 and Alg. 2, line 55).
Proofs of premature termination (PoPT). At any time, a
participant may eject (lines 60 and 66) from the protocol, pre-
maturely terminating their payment channels. Teechain em-
ploys PoPTs during the update of channel balances to avoid
inconsistent termination. When transitioning a set of payment
channels from payment state X to Y , if a node prematurely
terminates through eject (line 60), PoPTs ensure that all other
nodes terminate at the same state. Teechain enforces that set-
tlement transactions produced by channels in state X conflict
with those of channels in Y . Hence, only transactions from
either X or Y are accepted by the blockchain, but never both.
TEEs operating channels in the conflicting state must be pre-
sented with a settlement transaction s of a channel settled in
the opposite state; s acts as a PoPT to eject (line 66), autho-
rizing the TEE to generate a new nonconflicting transaction
to settle consistently (lines 70 and 72).
Enforcing transaction conflicts. For consistent channel set-
tlement, Teechain must ensure that transactions in state X
conflict with those in state Y . For blockchains offering ex-
pressive on-chain programmability, e.g. Ethereum, this can be
achieved through a smart contract that associates settlement
transactions for channels as part of a single multi-hop pay-
ment. For blockchains without smart contracts, e.g. Bitcoin,
Teechain constructs an intermediate path settlement transac-
tion, τ , that conflicts with individual pre- and post-payment
transactions by spending the same deposits and settling all
channels in the path at post-payment state. Using τ , channels
can be updated from pre- to post-payment state securely, by
moving to an intermediate state I between the transition. As I
settles channels using τ , transitions from pre-payment state
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to I, and I to post-payment state can occur safely because τ
conflicts with all individual settlement channel transactions.
Termination consistency using τ and PoPTs. Using τ and
PoPTs, Teechain settles channels consistently under prema-
ture termination. To construct τ , each TEE adds their chan-
nel deposits and post-payment balances (lock, line 11) and
signs τ (sign, lines 14 and 19), producing τ . Upon receipt of
τ (preUpdate, lines 21 and 26), each TEE prevents individual
channel settlement, and only allows premature termination
through τ . If all nodes receive τ successfully, the channel bal-
ances are updated to post-payment state (update, lines 32, 38
and 39), after which each TEE discards τ and allows termi-
nation of individual channels at post-payment state (line 64).
Channels locks are then released (release, line 46).
We differentiate three cases in which a participant prema-
turely terminates the protocol: (i) stage lock or sign—the TEE
generates pre-payment settlement transactions for its local
channels (line 64), and the participant places them on the
blockchain. All other participants use these transactions on
the blockchain as PoPT for their TEEs (line 66) to settle their
channels in pre-payment state (line 70); (ii) preUpdate or
update—if a participant ejects, their TEE settles all channels
using τ (line 65); and (iii) postUpdate or release—similar to
(i), the TEE generates post-payment settlement transactions
for its local channels (line 64) and the participant places them
on the blockchain. Other participants use these transactions
as PoPT for their TEEs (line 66) to settle their channels in
post-payment state (line 72).
5.2 Overcoming channel lock contention
Locking payment channels during multi-hop payments (§5.1)
prevents concurrent payments along the channels in that path.
To overcome this bottleneck, Teechain constructs temporary
channels between TEEs, allowing other payments to execute
in parallel along the same paths. If a primary channel expe-
riences high contention, temporary channels are created au-
tomatically using unassociated deposits. This is possible be-
cause Teechain can immediately create new channels and dy-
namically assign deposits (§4.1).
If a participant, Alice, wants to terminate any temporary
channels, they can be merged back into a single primary chan-
nel: Alice (i) executes multi-hop payments in a cycle to her-
self along the primary and temporary channels until the tem-
porary channels are at a neutral balance; and (ii) terminates
the temporary channels off-chain through deposit dissociation
(§4.1). We evaluate temporary channel performance in §7.4.
6 Chain replication and threshold signatures
TEEs in Teechain secure private keys for deposits. TEE
failures and compromises therefore pose a threat to fund
safety. Teechain uses a new variant of chain replication [68]
to protect against crash and Byzantine failures of TEEs. Chain
replication offers high availability and strong consistency,
without requiring all nodes to communicate with each other
directly. In peer-to-peer networks, such as Teechain, this is
advantageous to other protocols, such as Paxos [35], because
not all participants have direct connectivity due to network
address translation (NAT) and firewalls.
Force-freeze chain replication. Traditional chain replica-
tion replicates the state of a primary node to a set of backup
replicas [68], propagating state updates down the replication
chain and allowing read access from any backup. Applying
this approach naively to TEEs would make Teechain vulner-
able to roll-back and state forking attacks—attackers could
attain old states and transactions from a backup, continue to
execute payments via the primary, and then terminate at a pre-
vious state to steal funds. To overcome this, Teechain uses a
new force-freeze chain replication protocol that exploits the
chain replication structure: if a read access occurs to a backup,
the chain is broken, freezing all nodes at the current state, sim-
ilar to how failures are handled: future updates are prevented,
and all channels are settled and unused deposits released—
performed by contacting any live nodes in the chain.
Alg. 3 shows the force-freeze chain replication protocol for
creating a replication chain and executing state updates: to
create a backup b, a new TEE is initialized and assigned to
the tail t of an existing replication chain (assignAsBackupFor,
Alg. 3, line 7). Upon initialization, b and t perform remote at-
testation (lines 4 and 9) and establish a secure network chan-
nel (see §4) to begin replicating state. All TEEs in the chain
are kept synchronized by requiring an acknowledgement from
the backup before any state updates occur (line 24): updates
propagate down the chain, updating all backups, and once
the primary receives an acknowledgement from its backup, it
knows that all backups in the chain have been updated, and
can proceed to update (line 25) and continue (line 27).
6.1 Committee chains for secure deposits
Teechain secures fund deposits against Byzantine TEE fail-
ures by combining force-freeze chain replication with thresh-
old signatures [19] to construct committee chains. Commit-
tee chains distribute deposit state among multiple TEEs in
the network and exploit m-out-of-n multisignature blockchain
transactions to require threshold signatures to spend deposits.
Committee deposit creation. Committee chains are con-
structed per fund deposit in Teechain: participants create de-
posits by spending funds into an m-out-of-n multisignature
address on the blockchain, where m is the threshold number
of signatures required to spend the deposit, and n the total
number of committee members in that committee chain.
Alg. 1 shows the construction of 1-out-of-1 deposits, where
only a single private key is used to secure each deposit. The
protocol for constructing general m-out-of-n deposits is iden-
tical: first, a committee chain is constructed according to
Alg. 3; next, each of the n TEEs in the committee chain return
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Algorithm 3: Force-freeze chain replication protocol: backup assignment and state update at TEE t (For brevity, we omit the
encryption, signing and nonce protection of messages.)
1 /* Check given remote attestation */
2 /* and return own attestation. */
3 on receive(attest,h)
4 if verify(h) then
5 return hash (t)
6 return ⊥
7 on assignAsBackupFor (p)
8 assert tbacks =⊥
9 assert verify(send (p,attest,hash(t)))
10 if send (p,addBackup, t)(h) then
11 tbacks ← p /* Backup success */
12 else
13 fail
14 /* Handle incoming backup */
15 /* request and respond. */
16 on receive(addBackup,b)
17 if tbackup =⊥ then
18 tbackup ← b
19 return ack
20 return nack
21 on receive(stateUpdate,s)
22 if tbackup ≠⊥ then
23 /* Block until recv ack */
24 send (tbackup,stateUpdate,s)
25 tstate ← s /* Update state */
26 if tnode = primary then
27 return true
28 return ack /* Ack s update */
a cryptocurrency address from command newAddr (Alg. 1,
line 32); and, finally, participants spend funds into an m-out-
of-n multisignature address for the committee members, and
present the deposit to their primary TEE (newDeposit, Alg. 1,
line 36), which notifies all the TEEs in the committee chain
Dynamic deposit assignment. Deposits can be created inde-
pendently of payment channels (§4) and associated/dissoci-
ated with channels at runtime. Before channel association, de-
posits must first be approved by the remote party in the chan-
nel (approveMyDeposit, Alg. 1, line 48). This allows partici-
pants to accept deposits only if the values of m and n are ap-
propriate. The security requirements can be defined in the lo-
cal TEE of each participant, allowing automatic deposit ap-
proval. When selecting values, there are multiple considera-
tions: (i) 1-out-of-1 deposits require the private key for the
deposit to be shared with the remote TEE in the channel on
association (Alg. 1, line 73). This avoids having to trust the
counter party entirely for availability (see §4.1); (ii) 1-out-of-
m committee deposits offer fault tolerance against crash but
not Byzantine failures; and (iii) in the general case, to spend
committee deposits, a participant must acquire a sufficient
number of signatures for each deposit. Having many deposits
per payment channel, with large values of m for each deposit,
impacts blockchain transactions sizes; we explore this in §7.5.
Independent committee updates. Payment channels may
contain multiple deposits, and each deposit may have a sepa-
rate and independent committee chain. Teechain avoids hav-
ing to update multiple committee chains atomically when par-
ticipants issue large payments that affect the states of multi-
ple deposits. Teechain enforces that, for any large payment
that spans several deposits, the committee chains for those de-
posits must be identical, and thus the deposits state updates
can be batched together securely. If a large payment spans
deposits owned by separate committee chains, the payment
is broken down into smaller payments, only affecting one de-
posit at a time, and executed sequentially. Having many de-
posits in a payment channel, each with distinct committee
members, affects performance, which we evaluate in §7.2.
6.2 Persistant storage for crash faults
For users who do not wish to operate committee chains and
instead trust TEEs to be secure against compromise entirely,
Teechain provides crash fault tolerance by persisting TEE
and deposit state to local storage; upon failure, state can be
reloaded to settle channels and return deposits. To overcome
roll-back and state forking attacks, Teechain uses hardware
monotonic counters [25] and secure data sealing provided
by the TEE [3]. Since Intel SGX implementations currently
throttle monotonic counters to ten increments per second [57,
41], persistant storage for crash fault tolerance is limited to
ten operations per second. We overcome this using client-side
transaction batching, as discussed and shown in §7.2.
7 Evaluation
We evaluate the security of Teechain (§7.1) and the perfor-
mance of payment channels (§7.2), multi-hop payments (§7.3)
large-scale payment networks (§7.4), and the on-blockchain
cost (§7.5).
Implementation. We implement Teechain using Intel SGX
for the Bitcoin blockchain. Our implementation uses the
Linux Intel SGX SDK v2.1 [22] and a subset of Bitcoin
core [61]. We provide an alpha release of our implementation
online at: [redacted for anonymity]. Teechain consists of
83,000 lines of C/C++ code inside the TEE, and 5,000 lines
of untrusted code. As the Linux SGX SDK does not currently
support monotonic counters on all hardware [22], we emulate
them with a delay of 100 ms, as reported elsewhere [57, 41].
Baseline comparison. To measure performance, we define
throughput as the number of transactions sent per second,
and latency as the time from the moment a payment is issued
until an acknowledgement is received. At the time of writing,
the only payment network with a public implementation is
the Lightning Network (LN) [50]. We compare Teechain
against the Lightning Network Daemon (LND) [37]. Both LN
and Teechain can optionally batch transactions at the client
side, merging multiple payments into a single payment before
sending—at the cost of additional latency.
7.1 Security
Protocol correctness. Teechain achieves balance correct-
ness: the ability for any user to unilaterally reclaim their chan-
nels’ balances and unassociated deposits on the blockchain,
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Figure 3: Setup for evaluating Teechain performance
regardless of what actions other users may take. We provide a
brief outline of the correctness proof below—see Appendix A
for the formal definitions and full proofs.
We describe, using the Universal Composability (UC)
framework [11], an ideal functionality FTeechain, that captures
the desired behavior of the Teechain protocols. We define an
API for the Teechain functionality, e.g. procedures for han-
dling deposits, channels creation, and payments. We show,
through a series of steps starting at the real-world execution
and ending in the ideal one, that the real and ideal worlds are
indistinguishable to an external observer (or adversary). Fi-
nally, we prove in the ideal-world that FTeechain achieves bal-
ance correctness. Since the two worlds are indistinguishable,
Teechain in the real-world maintains the same security prop-
erties, thus achieving balance correctness.
Roll-back, replay and state forking attacks. Teechain mit-
igates against roll-back, replay and TEE state forking attacks:
(i) it authenticates TEEs and establishes secure network chan-
nels using public/private keys generated inside the TEE to
prevent messages from being shared between different TEE
instances (§4.1); (ii) it uses nonces or monotonic counters for
message freshness (§4.1 and §5.1); and (iii) it employs a fault
tolerance mechanism that protects against Byzantine TEEs
using committee chains (§6).
Denial-of-service (DoS) attacks. DoS attacks against spe-
cific TEEs in the network are possible e.g. attackers can block
communication between endpoints in the network, eclipse
nodes to prevent blockchain access, or force failures along
committee chains to degrade performance. To overcome this,
Teechain protects against DoS attacks through asynchronous
blockchain access and fault tolerance, ensuring DoS attacks
do not affect fund safety.
Side-channel attacks. Side-channel attacks violate data con-
fidentiality inside a TEE [67, 71]. Such attacks are one in-
stance of a TEE compromise, for which Teechain mitigates
using committee chains (§6). Our Teechain implementation
also hardens against side-channel attacks using side-channel
resistant libraries for sensitive data: (i) secp256k1, for ellip-
tic curve operations [60]; (ii) a side-channel resistant imple-
mentation of Elliptic-Curve Diffie-Hellman [64]; and (iii) a
secure AES-GCM implementation using AES-NI [64, 22].
We use program analysis techniques [39] to verify the correct
handling of sensitive data by these libraries.
Single payment Throughput Latency [99th %]
channel (tx/sec) (ms)
Lightning Network (LN) 1,000 387 [420]
Teechain
No fault tolerance 130,311 86 [93]
One replica (IL) 34,115 292 [301]
Two replicas (IL & UK) 33,180 415 [432]
Three replicas (IL, US & UK) 33,178 672 [691]
Outsourced channel, two replicas 33,178 483 [494]
Stable storage 10 288 [294]
Batching (no fault tolerance) 150,311 191 [196]
Batching (two replicas) 135,331 516 [530]
Batching (stable storage) 145,786 401 [408]
Table 1: Performance of payment channels
7.2 Performance of payment channels
We measure the performance of Teechain payment channels.
We answer three questions: (i) what is the maximum through-
put of a Teechain payment channel? (ii) how does fault toler-
ance affect channel performance? and (iii) how does transac-
tion batching affect throughput?
Experimental setup. We deploy Teechain on 33 SGX ma-
chines located in the UK, the US, and Israel. Fig. 3 shows
the network configurations, machine locations, and hardware.
We construct a payment channel between US and UK1. To
evaluate outsourced channels, IL1 acts as a non-SGX client
that constructs an outsourced channel between US and UK1.
In all experiments, both parties in the channel employ the
same fault tolerance strategy, i.e. both use committee chains of
the same length because performance is bound by the slowest
party. We vary the lengths n for m-out-of-n committee chains
and note that the value of m does not affect channel throughput
as all n committee members must replicate the state regardless.
When batching transactions in Teechain, we batch for 100 ms
before sending a single transaction. Teechain requires one
round-trip for a payment to complete, while LN requires two.
While Teechain can pipeline payments, LN only supports
sequential transactions and must batch by default.
Channel performance. Tab. 1 shows the average through-
put and latency. LN achieves a maximum throughput of
1,000 tx/sec, with a latency of 387 ms (99th percentile at
420 ms). Without fault tolerance, with deposits only secured
by a single committee member (n=1), Teechain has two orders
of magnitude higher throughput with a latency of 86 ms (no
batching). With two committee members (i.e. a single replica
in Israel) for each party, the throughput of Teechain is 34×
compared to LN, with similar latencies. Adding additional
committee members to each party’s committee chain only in-
creases latency due to additional RTTs—throughput is un-
changed. Using stable storage, performance is capped by the
hardware counters, resulting in 10 tx/sec, which can be over-
come by transaction batching. Teechain achieves between
135×–150× better performance than LN when batching.
Channel operations. Tab. 2 shows the performance of chan-
9
Latency (ms) [99th %]
Channel operation Local Outsourced
Lightning Network (LN)
Channel creation 3,600,000 [N/A]
Teechain
Channel creation 2,810 [4,205] 4,322 [5,201]
Replica creation 2,765 [3,910] 2,852 [3,993]
Associate/dissociate deposit
No fault tolerance 101 [110]
One backup (IL) 289 [297]
Two backups (IL & UK) 422 [429] 489 [514]
Three backups (IL, US & UK) 677 [681]
Stable storage 302 [309]
Table 2: Performance of payment channel operations
nel operations. LN channel creation takes approx. 60 mins,
as a transaction must be placed onto the blockchain and con-
firmation takes six Bitcoin blocks. Since Teechain decouples
channels and deposits, channel creation takes only 2.8 secs,
as deposits are already on the blockchain. Creation of an out-
sourced payment channel takes 4.3 secs, as the client (IL1)
also needs to verify the integrity of the outsourced TEE (US).
Creating replicas and adding them to committee chains incurs
similar latencies to channel creation. For associating and dis-
sociating deposits, latencies depend committee chain length n.
Discussion. Channel throughput in Teechain is affected by
fault tolerance: (i) without batching, no fault tolerance pro-
vides best performance, and stable storage performs worst due
to hardware counters; (ii) with batching, Teechain achieves
higher throughput for all fault tolerance mechanisms, even
stable storage, because transactions can be batched while
waiting for counters. Latencies are a function of the network,
state replication, hardware counters and any batching delay.
7.3 Performance of multi-hop payments
Next we evaluate the performance of Teechain multi-hop
payments. We use the same machines as in §7.2. We answer
two questions: (i) how does latency increase with the number
of hops in a payment chain? and (ii) how does fault tolerance
affect payment chain performance?
Experimental setup. We construct 11 payment channels, all
of which are transatlantic in the topology from Fig. 3. We
send transactions along the chain UK → US→ IL→ UK. For
UK and IL, we split the payment channels equally between
the machines to spread the load. All experiments use the
same payment channel overlay network. All nodes in the
multi-hop payment path use committee chains of the same
length. Committee members are deployed in different failure
domains, e.g. UK nodes are replicated to US and IL.
Multi-hop latency. We measure the latency of multi-hop
payments. We vary the number of hops and the number of
committee members per committee chain for each TEE. Fig. 4
shows that LN scales linearly with the length of the chain,
taking 1 sec to complete a payment across 2 hops (2 channels)
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Figure 4: Routing across Teechain payment chains
and 7 secs for 11 hops. Teechain also scales linearly, but with
different gradients: with no fault tolerance (i.e. committee
chains of length 1), latency is about 2× that of LN. Using a
single replica (i.e. committee chains of length 2 at each node),
payments across 2 hops take 5 secs; payments across 11 hops
take 23 secs. The 3×–4× overhead compared to LN is a due
to the extra network round trips required for payment routing.
Multi-hop throughput. To update all channels in a
multi-hop payment consistently, both Teechain and LN do
not pipeline multi-hop payments. Therefore, throughput
is 1/latency. Teechain and LN thus batch transactions:
throughput becomes the batch size divided by the latency
to complete the payment. We compare throughput for
Teechain and LN, with each Teechain node using two repli-
cas. Teechain batches 135,000 tx/sec, while LN batches
1,000 tx/sec (see §7.2). With this, the throughput of Teechain
for 2 hops is 14,062 tx/sec, while it is 3,649 tx/sec for 11 hops.
For LN, throughput for 2 hops is 862 tx/sec, and 139 tx/sec
for 11 hops. Teechain thus outperforms LN by between 16×-
26× for between 2 and 11 hops, respectively.
Discussion. Teechain requires three round trips to complete
a payment, while LN requires only 1.5. Teechain must syn-
chronize nodes off-chain with additional messages to sup-
port asynchronous blockchain access. In addition, Teechain
is network-bound: replicating state to committee members in-
creases latency.
7.4 Performance of payment networks
We also evaluate the performance of a Teechain payment
network. We use the 30 machines located in the UK (Fig. 3) to
conduct our experiments. We answer two questions: (i) how
does the overlay network topology affect throughput? and
(ii) how does fault tolerance affect throughput?
Payment workload. As there exist no public micro-payment
datasets, we use the transactions found in the Bitcoin block-
chain. To adapt the Bitcoin transaction history, we filter out
transactions that are not appropriate for replaying, such as
those that spend to/from multi-signature addresses, or pay-
ments of value over a certain threshold (i.e. $100). For trans-
actions with multi-input and output addresses, we choose only
one. This results in a dataset of over 150 million payments
from a source to a recipient address.
Overlay network topologies. We construct two overlay pay-
ment network topologies: (i) a complete graph, in which
all nodes in the network have a direct payment channel to
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Avg. Avg. Avg.
Approach Throughput Latency Num hops
(tx/sec) (ms)
No fault tolerance 671 540 3.2
One replica 210 720 3.2
Dynamic routing (No FT) 235 690 5.4
Dynamic routing (One replica) 54 910 5.4
Table 3: Performance with hub-and-spoke topology
all other nodes; and (ii) a hub-and-spoke topology, shown
in Fig. 5, in which the nodes are connected with 3 tiers of
connectivity: tier 1 nodes have highest connectivity and tier 3
nodes lowest connectivity. We emulate wide-area network
links by adding 100 ms latency between each machine.
Experimental setup. To execute payments in the network,
we assign Bitcoin addresses to the machines. For all pay-
ments, the machine assigned ownership over the sending ad-
dress is responsible for issuing payments to the recipient ad-
dresses and corresponding machines. For the complete graph,
we randomly and evenly distributing all Bitcoin addresses
between the machines; for the hub-and-spoke graph, we dis-
tribute the addresses in a skewed fashion, with larger nodes
being assigned more addresses than smaller nodes, as would
be expected in a realistic deployment. We assign 50% of ad-
dresses to tier 1 nodes, 35% to tier 2, and 15% to tier 3.
For each graph deployment, we compare the throughput
with differently sized committee chains, for n = 1 to n = 3
committee members per deposit. All machines in the graph
operate the same fault tolerance mechanism per experiment.
Measurement begins when the first payment is issued, and
ends when an acknowledgement for the last payment is re-
ceived. As payments may fail, e.g. due to channel locking,
upon receiving a failure notification, the payment is retried
after a random amount of time between 100 ms–200 ms. To
bound the degree to which out-of-order payments can be exe-
cuted, we implement a sliding window of payments at each
machine. Each machine issues W=1000 payments across the
network in parallel, and waits for acknowledgements before
moving the sliding window.
Complete graph throughput. We execute the Bitcoin work-
load across several complete Teechain graphs. We vary the
number of nodes in the deployment from 5 to 30 machines.
Fig. 6 shows the achieved network throughput for each de-
ployment. For all fault tolerant strategies, throughput scales
linearly with the number of nodes. No fault tolerance (n = 1)
performs best (2.2 million tx/sec with 30 machines), while
the use of committee chains with n > 1 limits throughput (1
million tx/sec with 30 machines). There is little difference
(9%) between n = 2 committee members per deposit and n =
3—with chain replication, throughput is bottlenecked by the
time taken to replicate state. We note that, in a complete
graph deployment, there is no need for multi-hop payments.
Hub-and-spoke throughput. We execute the Bitcoin work-
load with the hub-and-spoke graph deployment from Fig. 5.
For multi-hop payments, we use the shortest possible path—
if there are multiple, only one is chosen. Tab. 3 shows the re-
sults. Without fault tolerance (n = 1), the network achieves
around 671 tx/sec, with an average payment latency of ap-
prox. 500 ms. With two comittee members per deposit (n = 2),
throughput is around 210 tx/sec, with slightly higher laten-
cies. The average number of hops per payment is around 3.
Topology comparison. Payment throughput degrades sig-
nificantly in the hub-and-spoke topology compared to the
complete graph topology: more than 1000× when compar-
ing the topologies with 20 machines and identical fault toler-
ance. This is a result of having to lock channels during multi-
hop payments, forcing payments to compete for channels. To
overcome this, we implement and evaluate two approaches to
avoid locking contention: (i) dynamic routing to allow pay-
ments to execute across different paths in the graph, so as to
route around contention; and (ii) temporary channels to allow
concurrent payments between endpoints (see §5.2).
Dynamic routing. Tab. 3 shows the throughput when pay-
ments are retried using different paths. When retrying pay-
ments, each machine first tries the shortest path, before incre-
mentally trying longer paths. Throughput with dynamic rout-
ing degrades by between 50%–70% depending on fault toler-
ance. This is a result of longer multi-hop paths, locking up
more channels; seen by more hops per payment on average.
Temporary channels. Fig. 7 shows how throughput in-
creases when tier 1 and 2 nodes in the hub-and-spoke graph
support temporary channel creation. We avoid temporary
channels for tier 3 nodes because it is unlikely that individual
users are willing to deposit funds. As seen, throughput scales
almost linearly with the number of temporary channels (G),
for both no fault tolerance (n = 1 committee members) and
one replica (n = 2). The results show diminishing returns as
G increases because tier 3 nodes still suffer from congestion.
Discussion. Locking channels during multi-hop payments
creates contention: if high performance is required in a pay-
ment network, the graph must have high connectivity. Tempo-
rary channels can achieve this, however, performance is best
when there is a direct payment channel between sender and
recipient.
7.5 Blockchain cost
Payment networks place transactions on the blockchain to op-
erate payment channels. We evaluate and compare: (i) the
number of transactions that Teechain places onto the block-
chain; and (ii) the associated blockchain cost.
We define the blockchain cost as the amount of data placed
on the blockchain to open and close a payment channel. Un-
like existing solutions, Teechain can assign multiple deposits
to a single channel. For a fair comparison, we assume at
most two deposits per channel. We abstract from particular
blockchains and approximate cost by counting the pairs of
public keys and signatures that must be placed onto the block-
chain [9]: a cost of 1 means one public key and one signature.
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channels
Payment Bilateral Unilateral
channel #txs cost #txs cost
LN [50] 4 6 4 6
DMC [15] 2 4 1+d+2 2(1+d+2)
SFMC [9] 2/n 2p/n (1+i)/n (1+i)(p/n)
+(1+d+2) +2(1+d+2)
Teechain 1 1+ (n/2) 3 1+ (n1/2)+1
+(n2/2)+m1 +m2
Table 4: Number of transactions and blockchain costs
Tab. 4 shows the number of transactions and the block-
chain cost. For all solutions but LN, the number of transac-
tions and the blockchain cost is higher if one party unilater-
ally closes the payment channel. For Duplex Micropayment
Channels (DMC) [15], the number of transactions required
for each channel ranges from 2 to 1+d +2, where d ≥ 1 de-
fines the DMC transaction chain length. Since each DMC
transaction requires 2 public keys and 2 signatures, the asso-
ciated cost is the number of transactions multiplied by 2. In
LN, 4 transactions must be placed onto the blockchain, which
contain both 6 public keys and 6 signatures, thus resulting in
a cost of 6 across bilateral and unilateral termination.
For Scalable Funding of Micropayment Chan-
nels (SFMC) [9], the number of transactions required for each
channel ranges from 2/n to (1+ i)/n+ (1+d +2), where n is
the total number of constructed payment channels and i ≥ 1
and d ≥ 1 define the funding and transaction chain’s lengths.
Since SFMC (i) constructs shared channel groups of size
p > 2; and (ii) builds on DMC payment channels, it is possi-
ble that p parties do not collaboratively close payment chan-
nels. Since each SFMC transaction (i) requires p signatures
and (ii) is shared between the n payment channels, this results
in a blockchain cost of 2p/n for each payment channel if all
parties collaboratively close payment channels; (1+ i)(p/n)+
2(1+d +2) for each payment channel if closed unilaterally.
Teechain constructs funding deposits using m-out-of-n
transactions. If the channel has been funded by a single de-
posit and is settled off-chain, only one transaction is required,
with the cost being 1+ (n/2)—the cost of a signature and pub-
lic key to spend funds into the deposit address, and n public
keys to specify the committee members. (We divide n by 2
as cost is defined in terms of both public keys and signatures
together.) Otherwise, with two deposits assigned to a chan-
nel and on-chain settlement, Teechain requires 3 transactions,
with the cost being the sum of the costs of the two funding
deposits plus the settlement transaction.
Discussion. Assuming a 2-out-of-3 multisignature construc-
tion for each funding deposit, Teechain places 25%–75%
fewer transactions on the blockchain than LN, and is up to
58% more efficient when comparing blockchain cost for bilat-
eral termination. For unilateral termination, Teechain is 50%
more expensive due to larger multisignature transactions. For
DMC and bilateral closure, Teechain places 50% fewer trans-
actions and 37% less data on the blockchain than DMC. For
unilateral closure and d > 1, Teechain outperforms DMC.
While Teechain outperforms SMFC for all values of i, d,
p and n, in the case of closing channels unilaterally, SMFC
places fewer transactions and less data onto the blockchain if
n > 1 and p/n > 1 and if all parties agree on closing payment
channels. This is because SFMC shares transaction numbers
and costs across multiple parties and channels, however, at
the cost of having to trust all involved parties. Teechain, on
the other hand, does not require any assumptions about the
correct behaviour of other parties.
8 Conclusion
Teechain is the first blockchain payment network to operate
with asynchronous blockchain access and offer dynamic col-
lateral assignment; funds can be assigned to payment chan-
nels at runtime, and channels can be created instantly, without
blockchain writes. Teechain mitigates against Byzantine TEE
failures through a novel combination of chain replication and
threshold secret sharing. We evaluated Teechain using Intel
SGX on the Bitcoin blockchain; our results show orders of
magnitude performance gains compared to the state of the art.
Finally, Teechain is blockchain agnostic and the protocols pre-
sented are independent of any specific TEE implementation.
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A Teechain Protocol Correctness
We first intuitively define the security guarantees a payment
network should provide (Appendix A.1) and describe the
framework we use to construct our proofs (Appendix A.2
and Appendix A.3). We then formally prove that Teechain
achieves the desired security properties for both channels (Ap-
pendix A.4) and multi-hop payments (Appendix A.5).
A.1 Security Guarantees
Teechain protects the funds of all participants in the network;
despite what others may do, funds cannot be stolen or double
spent. We define balance correctness to express intuitively:
at any point during an execution, any party can unilaterally
reclaim the channels’ balances and unassociated deposits on
the underlying blockchain, correctly reflecting all payments.
Participants must be able to do so despite other’s actions.
To formalize balance correctness, we first define an execu-
tion trace σ as a time-ordered series of events, where each
event represents an operation and its return value; σt denotes
the prefix of σ until time t. For execution trace σ , user u,
and time t, denote by Lt (u) the balance of u in σ at time t
on the blockchain, i.e., the sum of all the funds u has access
to on the blockchain. In particular, L0 (u) is the initial bal-
ance of u in σ . Denote by paidt (u) the accumulated sum of
all payments made by u in σt using Teechain channels; and
by rcvdt (u) the accumulated sum of payments received by u
in σt . We thus define the perceived balance of u in σ at time t
as perceivedBalt (u) = L0 (u)+ rcvdt (u)− paidt (u). We there-
fore define balance correctness as:
Definition A.1 (Balance Correctness). A protocol satisfies
balance correctness if for any prefix σt , any well-behaved
user u can unilaterally perform a series of operations, possi-
bly interleaved with operations of other users, that will com-
plete at finite time t ′ ≥ t, after which at any time t ′′ ≥ t ′ ∶
Lt ′′ (u) ≥ perceivedBalt (u).
A well-behaved user, is one that faithfully follows the
Teechain protocol, stores private keys used to communicate
with the ledger securly, and does not leak them to other users
in the system.
A.2 Ideal Functionalities and Simulation
Based Security
Simulation Based Proofs in the Universal-Composability
Framework. Our formal proof for Teechain’s channel pro-
tocol is based on the simulation based security framework
Universal Composability (UC) [11], which is a general pur-
pose framework for modeling and constructing secure proto-
cols. The model is based on a system of interactive Turing
machines (ITMs), which are described based upon how they
behave when receiving messages from other ITMs.
The UC framework includes several ITMs: an environ-
ment E, which represents the external world. The environ-
ment chooses the inputs given to each party in the system,
and observes the outputs. The framework also includes hon-
est parties which follow the protocol, and a byzantine adver-
sary A, that can corrupt users at will. Our model deals with
an adaptive adversary, i.e., once a user is corrupted by A, it
cannot be uncorrupted again until the end of the execution.
We only define the security guarantees of honest users who
follow the Teechain protocol.
The model also includes ideal functionalities, which act as
idealized third parties, and implement some target specifica-
tions. We describe the behavior of such ideal functionalities
based on an exposed API. This API exhibits the desired prop-
erties of the protocol. Ideal functionalities are also used in
the real-world in order to represent network primitives and
setup assumptions, and we use them to also model TEEs and
the blockchain.
The proof that some protocol captures a specific property
in the UC framework consists of the following stages:
1. Showing that any real-world execution is indistinguish-
able to the external environment E from an equivalent
ideal-world execution. The proof is based on describing
a simulator S in the ideal-world, which translates every
adversary A in the real-world into a simulated attacker,
which is indistinguishable to the environment. We do so
in hybrid steps, and in each step we prove indistinguisha-
bility to the environment from the previous hybrid step.
2. Proving that the desired property of the protocol is main-
tained by the ideal functionality in the ideal-world.
Since the real-world and ideal-world are indistinguishable,
if an attacker breaks a security guarantee in the real-world,
then it will also break in the ideal-one. Thus, to prove a
security guarantee holds in the real-world, it is sufficient to
show it holds in the ideal one.
Real-World Execution. The real-world Teechain channel
protocol is identical to the one described in §4, except that
we model the TEE and the ledger as ideal functionalities in
the UC framework. This model is based on previous works
that formalized the model, such as [55, 52, 5, 72, 40].
Ideal functionality FTEE. FTEE is an ideal functionality that
models a TEE. This model is based on a version of the ideal
functionality of Shi et al. [55]. User U is a Teechain user
equipped with a TEE; prog is some program to run in an en-
clave; inp, outp, mem are the prog input, output and mem-
ory tape respectively. We further let sid as the session identi-
fier and id is the enclave identifier. λ is a security parameter,
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and Σ,KGen are a signature scheme and its key generation
algorithm respectively. Lastly, let PKTEE, SKTEE be a TEE’s
public-key and secret-key generated on the TEE’s initializa-
tion.
An enclave is an isolated software container loaded with
some program, in our case the Teechain protocol. FTEE ab-
stracts an enclave as a third party trusted for execution, con-
fidentiality and authenticity, with respect to any user that is
part of the system, and in particular U that owns the TEE.
We now describe the API of FTEE. When initialized, FTEE
generates a public secret key pair, and publicizes the public
key, i.e., other users or TEEs can verify messages signed by
other FTEE. This corresponds to an attestation service pro-
vided in the real-world execution. In addition, FTEE includes
two calls, one for the installation of a new program prog, and
the other one is a resume call for prog with some input.
The full API of FTEE is:
Algorithm 4: FTEE’s API
Input: (PKTEE,SKTEE)← KGen (1λ )
1 on receive (sid, idx, install, inp) from Ui:
2 if (idx,Ui, , ) is not stored then
3 store (idx,Ui,prog, inp)
4 else
5 return
6 end
7 on receive (sid, idx, resume, inp) from Ui:
8 if (idx,Ui,prog, mem) is stored then
9 outp,mem← prog (inp, mem)
10 store (idx,Ui,prog,mem)
11 σ ← Σ.Sign (SKTEE, (prog, outp))
12 return (sid, idx, outp,σ ) to Ui
13 else
14 return ⊥
15 end
FTEE is a setup assumption [11] that models the functional-
ity offered by real-world TEEs, and in particular Intel’s SGX.
Due to this, FTEE uses a ”real” signature scheme Σ, rather
than an ideal version of it [12]. We assume that the signature
scheme Σ used by FTEE is unforgeable under chosen attacks,
and that all parties Ui know PKTEE of all the other TEEs at
the start of the execution. We note that in order to deal with
real-world SGX vulnerabilities, we use different methods to
mitigate such attacks (see §7.1).
Each user U is identified by unique id (simply denoted
by U, or Alice and Bob), and a session id sid, obtained from
the environment E [12]. Parties send messages to each other
via authenticated channels, and the adversary A observes all
messages sent over the network. We use the standard ”delayed
messages” terminology [12]: when a message msg is sent
between users, msg is first sent to A (the simulator S), and
forwarded to the intended user U, after the acknowledgment
by S. Furthermore, S can delay messages between parties
(i.e., asynchronous network), but eventually delivers them.
Note that FTEE is a local ideal functionality: a user U
can talk to its FTEE without the messages being leaked to A.
However, when A corrupts a user it gets full access to the
user’s software and hardware. A can fully observe all the
calls made to FTEE, but cannot tamper with the hardware’s
confidentiality, integrity and authenticity guarantees.
Ideal functionality FLedger. An ideal functionality that repre-
sents the ledger, i.e., the underlying blockchain. It maintains
a single list, B, that represents the balances of all the users in
the system. Each entry has a public key PK and any instruc-
tion to edit an entry requires the message to be signed by the
corresponding private key, SK. Entries in B are in the form
of (PK,amount), where amount is the current balance associ-
ated with the public key.
At the beginning of the execution, i.e. at t = 0, B contains
initial entries with balances for the different public keys in
the system. Also, some of the users also have the correspond-
ing secret keys matching to the above public keys. FLedger
exposes two types of API calls, one is designed to transfer
money from one entry in B to another, and one is designed to
query FLedger on existing entries.
Algorithm 5: FLedger’s API
Input: The initial balances of all the public keys are stored in B
1 on receive (transfer,PKu,amount,σ ,PKv) from u:
2 if Σ.verify(PKu,σ )∧∃bal ∶ B(PKu) = bal∧bal ≥ amount then
3 B(PKv)← B(PKv)+amount
4 B(PKu)← B(PKu)−amount
5 else
6 return ⊥
7 end
8 on receive (getLedgerBalance,PKu)
9 if ∃bal ∶ B(PKu) = bal) then
10 return bal
11 else
12 return ⊥
13 end
We model the real-world execution of Teechain in the(FTEE,FLedger) hybrid-model.
We are now ready to formally define balance correctness
and perceived balance of any user using Teechain.
Ideal-World Model. We define the ideal functional-
ity FTeechain which captures Teechain’s protocol. FTeechain is
defined by an internal state of its internal variables, and by an
API, which users can invoke. An invocation of an API call
call by user u with arguments (arg1,arg2, . . . ) is denoted by:
callu(arg1,arg2, . . . ).
The internal variables FTeechain maintains are described
in Fig. 8, a description of each call is described in Fig. 9, and
the complete algorithm is described in Alg. 6.
A.3 Indistinguishability of the real-world and
ideal-world
We now move to show that the real-world execution is indis-
tinguishable to the external environment from the ideal-world
one.
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FTeechain maintains the following internal variables:
L Set of funds for the users using FTeechain. L captures the same
functionality as FLedger in the real-world.
Entries are in the form of (u,amount), where amount is u’s
amount on the ledger.
C Set of all open channels. We denote as u and v as two users
who have an open channel between them, amountU and
amountV as u’s and v’s balances on the channel, cid as a
unique channel identifier agreed between u and v prior to
the opening, and isSymmetric as a boolean variable indicat-
ing the two different states a channel between two users can
be in, i.e., whether the channel is open for both users or just
the channel opening initiator.
Entries in C are in the form of(cid,u,v,amountU,amountV, isSymmetric).
D Set of deposits associated with an open channel. We denote
deposit id as a unique identifier given to each new deposit
by FTeechain, amount as the amount of the deposit, u as the
user who added the deposit, cid as the channel identifier the
deposit is associated to (or ⊥ if the deposit is not associated
with any channel), and isSymmetric as a boolean variable
indicating if the deposit is associated to a channel, and both
users are aware of this association.
Entries in D are in the form of(deposit id,amount,u,cid, isSymmetric).
PendingDeposits This is a set of deposits in the process of dis-
sociation from a channel, i.e., a user u who initiated a de-
posit dissociation and the dissociation is not approved yet
by the other party of the channel.
Entries in PendingDeposits: are in the format of(deposit id,u, isSymmetric).
PendingPayments Set of pending payments, i.e., if user u sent
a payment to v, and v did not accept the payment yet.
Entries in PendingPayments: are in the form of(cid,v,amount). cid is the channel id where the payment
with amount amount is pending.
PendingChannels Set of channels in the process of being set-
tled. In order to fully settle a channel both of its users need
to settle it separately. If only one of the users settled the
channel and other user did not, then this set will reflect it.
Entries in PendingChannels: are in the form of (cid,v), were
cid is the channel identifier and v is the party that did not set-
tle the channel yet.
PendingLedgerPayments Set of pending payments waiting to
be added to the ledger L.
Entries in PendingLedgerPayments are in the form of(ledger payment id,u,amount), where ledger payment id
is a unique id of the payment given by FTeechain, u is the re-
cipient of the payment of amount amount.
Figure 8: FTeechain’s Internal Variables
Lemma 1. The Teechain channel protocol in the(FTEE,FLedger) hybrid model UC-realizes the ideal function-
ality FTeechain.
Proof. Let A be an adversary against the Teechain protocol.
We construct an ideal-world adversary (the simulator) S, such
that any environment E cannot distinguish between interacting
with the adversary A and the Teechain protocol or with the
simulator S and the ideal functionality FTeechain.
We do so by a series of hybrid steps starting at the real-
world execution of the protocol in the (FTEE,FLedger) hybrid -
H0, and eventually reaching the ideal world. At each step we
prove indistinguishability.
• Hybrid H0 is the real-world execution in the(FTEE,FLedger) hybrid model.
• Hybrid H1 behaves the same as H0 except that S generates
a secret-public key pair (SK, PK) for the signing scheme
Σ and publishes the public key PK. When A wants to
communicate with its FTEE, S faithfully emulates FTEE’s
behavior, and records A’s messages.
As S’s simulation of the real-world protocol is done
perfectly, the environment E cannot distinguish between
H0 (the real-world execution) and H1.
• Hybrid H2 behaves the same as H1 except for the follow-
ing difference: whenever A wants to communicate with
FLedger, S faithfully emulates FLedger’s behavior for A.
As A’s view in H2 are perfectly emulated for him when
interacting with the ledger, no environment E can distin-
guish between H2 and H1.
• Hybrid H3 behaves the same as H2 except for the follow-
ing difference: If A invoked its FTEE with a correct in-
stall message with program prog, then for every correct
resume message S records the tuple (msg,σ ) from FTEE,
where msg is the output of running prog in FTEE, and σ
is the signature generated inside the FTEE, using the SK
generated in H1.
Let Ω denote all such possible tuples. If (msg,σ ) ∉ Ω
then S aborts, otherwise, S delivers the message to Bob
(the party in the protocol that is not controlled by A).
We can argue that H2 is indistinguishable from H1 by
reducing the problem to the EU-CMA of the signing
scheme. If A does not send one of the correct tuples to
the other party, then the other party’s attestation (veri-
fication mechanism) will fail (but with negligible prob-
ability). Otherwise, E and A can be leveraged to con-
struct an adversary that succeeds in a signature forgery.
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The following calls are for user interaction with the ledger:
getLedgerBalance Upon receiving getLedgerBalancev(u)
from any user v in the system, FTeechain returns the current
entry in L indicating u’s balance on the ledger.
acceptLedgerPayment Upon receiving this call from a
user u in the system, FTeechain checks if u has a pending pay-
ment waiting to be reflected on the ledger L. If so, FTeechain
changes L to reflect the payment.
The following calls capture the unilateral deposit handling of
users:
addDeposit When receiving this call FTeechain adds a new de-
posit for user u.
removeDeposit User u can call this function to remove an
unassociated deposit from the system and add the deposit’s
amount back on the ledger.
The last set of calls captures the logic of user interaction with
other users and handle channels in the system:
openChannel u invokes this call in order to initiate a channel
opening between her and another user in the system.
acceptChannelOpen v can invoke this call to complete the
channel opening process. This call can be invoked by the v
after openChannel is invoked.
associateDeposit u can invoke this call in order to start the
process of associating a deposit with a specific channel.
acceptAssociateDeposit v invokes this call to complete the
process of associating the deposit deposit id. In the real-
world execution v needs to make sure at this stage that the
deposit is on the ledger.
dissociateDeposit Invoked by u to start dissociating deposit
deposit id from a channel it is associated to.
acceptDissociate The second phase of dissociating a deposit
from a channel, indicating that the other party in the chan-
nel accepted the dissociation.
ackDissociate Completes the dissociation of a deposit from a
channel.
After the call ends successfully the deposit can be removed
or associated again with another channel by u.
pay User u invokes this function to pay amount on channel cid
to user v. When the call ends, FTeechain returns to u a pay-
ment id pending payment id.
receivePayment v invokes this function to accept a payment
with payment id pending payment id made by another user
on a channel. After the call ends, v’s balance on the channel
is increased by amount.
settleChannel u invokes this call to settle channel cid, i.e., re-
ceive his current balance from the channel on the ledger.
When invoked, FTeechain generates a pending payment
pending payment id which reflects u’s balance on the chan-
nel and returns it to u.
Figure 9: FTeechain’s Calls
• Hybrid H4 is the same as H3 except that for the following
difference: Whenever A delivers a signed message (by
himself or from his FTEE) to other users in the system
signed by a secret key of Teechain’s protocol, S behaves
as in H3, i.e., S records the tuple (msg,σ ), and as in H4, S
aborts if msg is not signed correctly by the corresponding
secret key.
H4 is indistinguishable from H3 for the same reasons
H3 is indistinguishable from H2, i.e., otherwise E and A
will be able to construct an adversary that can succeed
in signature forgery.
• Hybrid H5 is the ideal world execution, i.e., we map the
calls in the simulated real-world to calls of S to FTeechain.
◦ newPayChannel Whenever a user sends
newPayChannel to FTEE to create a new chan-
nel, S sends a openChannel message to FTeechain
in the ideal world.
◦ newChannelAck Whenever newChannelAck is deliv-
ered to the recipient in the real-world, S invokes
acceptChannelOpen to FTeechain.
◦ approvedDeposit Whenever a user invokes his
FTEE with approvedDeposit after correctly trans-
ferring money on the ledger by invoking transfer
to FLedger, S invokes FTeechain with addDeposit,
and records the returned deposit id.
◦ releaseDeposit Whenever a user invokes
releaseDeposit to his FTEE, S calls
removeDeposit to FTeechain with the correspond-
ing pending payment id, and when the user calls
transfer to FLedger in order to place the tx on the
ledger, S calls acceptLedgerPayment with the
corresponding pending payment id.
◦ associateMyDeposit Whenever a user sends
associateMyDeposit to another user in the sys-
tem, S sends associateDeposit to FTeechain on
that user’s behalf.
◦ associateTheirDeposit Whenever a user invokes
FTEE with associateTheirDeposit, the simulator
S calls acceptAssociateDeposit with the corre-
sponding deposit id deposit id.
◦ dissociateDeposit When a user correctly in-
vokes his FTEE with dissociateDeposit, S calls
dissociateDeposit.
◦ dissociatedDeposit When a user passes to his
FTEE dissociatedDeposit message, S invokes
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Algorithm 6: FTeechain’s API
1 ∀u ∶ L(u)←⊥
2 ∀cid ∶ C(cid)←⊥
3 ∀deposit id ∶ D(deposit id)←⊥
4 ∀deposit id ∶ PendingDeposits(deposit id)←⊥
5 ∀pending payment id ∶
PendingPayments(pending payment id)←⊥
6 ∀cid ∶ PendingChannels(cid)←⊥
7 ∀ledger payment id ∶
PendingLedgerPayments(ledger payment id)←⊥
8 on getLedgerBalancev(u) /* The Ledger is public,
any user can get the balance of any other user in the
system */
9 if L(u) ≠⊥ then
10 return (success,L(u))
11 else
12 return (fail)
13 on acceptLedgerPaymentu(ledger payment id)
14 if ∃amount ∶
PendingLedgerPayments(ledger payment id) =(u,amount) then
15 L(u)← L(u)+amount
16 PendingLedgerPayments(ledger payment id)←⊥
17 return (success)
18 else
19 return (fail)
20 on addDepositu(amount)
21 if L(u) ≥ amount /* If u has enough money on the
ledger to create the deposit */
22 then
23 deposit id← textitdeposit counter
24 deposit counter← deposit counter+1
25 D(deposit id)← (amount, u, ⊥,⊥)
26 L(u)← L(u)−amount
27 return (success, deposit id)
28 else
29 return (fail)
30 on removeDepositu(deposit id)
31 if ∃amount, isSymmetric ∶ D(deposit id) =(amount, u, ⊥, isSymmetric) /* deposit entry is not
associated with any channel */
then
32 PendingLedgerPayments(ledger payment id)←(u,amount)
33 ledger payment id← ledger payment id+1
34 D(deposit id)←⊥
35 return (success, ledger payment id)
36 else
37 return (fail)
38 on openChannelu(cid,v)
39 if C(cid) =⊥ /* there is not a channel entry with cid */
then
40 C(cid)← (u,v,0,0,⊥) /* initialize an entry for the
channel with capacity 0 for both sides */
41 return (success)
42 else
43 return (fail)
44 on acceptChannelOpenv(cid)
45 if ∃amountU,amountV ∶ C(cid) =(u,v,amountU,amountV,⊥) then
46 C(cid)← (u,v,amountU,amountV,⊤)
47 return (success)
48 else
49 return (fail)
50 on associateDepositu(cid,deposit id)
51 if ∃amount ∶ D(deposit id) = (amount, u, ⊥,⊥)∧
∃x,y,amountX, amountY, isSymmetric ∶ C(cid) =(x,y,amountU,amountV, isSymmetric)∧ (x =
u∨ y = u) then
52 if y = u∧ isSymmetric =⊥ /* the channel is not
accepted by both parties */ then
53 return (fail)
54 D(deposit id)← (amount, u, cid, ⊥) /* assign the
deposit to channel cid */ if x = u then
55 C(cid)←(x, y, amountX + amount, amountY, isSymmetric)
56 else
57 C(cid)←(x, y, amountX, amountY + amount, isSymmetric)
58 return (success)
59 else
60 return (fail)
61 on acceptAssociateDepositv(cid,deposit id)
62 if ∃amount ∶ D(deposit id) = (amount, u, cid, ⊥)
then
63 D(deposit id)← (amount, u, cid, ⊤)
64 return (success)
65 else
66 return (fail)
67 on dissociateDepositu(deposit id)
68 if ∃amount,cid, isSymmetric ∶ D(deposit id) =(amount, u, cid, isSymmetric)∧
∃v,amountU,amountV, isSymmetric ∶ C(cid) =(cid,u,v,amountU,amountV, isSymmetric)∧
amount ≤ amountU /* The deposit is accepted by
both sides, and u has enough capacity in the
channel to dissociate */
69 then
70 C(cid)←(cid,u,v,amountU−amount,amountV, isSymmetric)
/* deduct the deposit’s amount from u’s
capacity in the channel */
71 PendingDeposits(deposit id)← (u,⊥) /* entry in-
dicating deposit id is about to be dissociated */
72 return (success)
73 else
74 return (fail)
75 on acceptDissociatev(deposit id)
76 if ∃u s.t. PendingDeposits(deposit id) = (u,⊥) then
77 PendingDeposits(deposit id)← (u,⊤)
78 return (success)
79 else
80 return (fail)
81 on ackDissociateu(deposit id)
82 if PendingDeposits(deposit id) = (u,⊤) then
83 PendingDeposits(deposit id)←⊥
84 D(deposit id)← (deposit id, amount, u, ⊥,⊥)
//change third argument of the entry to indicate
the dissociation is completed
85 return (success)
86 else
87 return (fail)
88 on payu(cid,amount)
89 if ∃x,y, amountX, amountY, isSymmetric ∶ C(cid) =(x, y, amountX, amountY, isSymmetric)∧((isSymmetric =⊤)∨ (isSymmetric =⊥∧ x = u))
then
90 if x = u∧amount ≤ amountX then
91 C(cid)←(x, y, amountX - amount, amountY, isSymmetric)
92 PendingPayments(pending payment id)←(y, cid, amount)
93 if y = u∧amount ≤ amountY then
94 C(cid)←(x, y, amountX, amountY - amount, isSymmetric)
95 PendingPayments(pending payment id)←(x, cid, amount)
96 pending payment id← pending payment id+1
97 return (success,pending payment id)
98 else
99 return (fail)
100 on receivePaymentv(pending payment id)
101 if ∃cid, amount ∶
PendingPayments(pending payment id) =(v,cid,amount) then
102 C(cid)← (u,v,amountV+amount, isSymmetric)
103 return (success)
104 PendingPayments(pending payment id)←⊥
105 else
106 return (fail)
107 on settleChannelu(cid)
108 if ∃v,amountU,amountV, isSymmetric ∶ C(cid) =(u,v,amountU,amountV, isSymmetric) then
109 pendingDeposits← {deposit id∣
PendingDeposits(deposit id) = (u,⊥)∨ (u,⊤)}
110 pendingDepositsSum←∑x∈pendingDeposits x /*
Need to remove all the deposits that their
dissociation is not completed */
111 PendingLedgerPayments(ledger payment id)←(u,amountU+pendingDepositsSum)
112 ledger payment id← ledger payment id+1
113 foreach (deposit id ∈ pendingDeposits):
PendingDeposits(deposit id) =⊥
114 foreach (deposit id ∈ pendingDeposits) ∶
D(deposit id)←⊥
115 C(cid)← (u,v,0,amountV, isSymmetric)
116 if PendingChannels(cid) =⊥ /* If this is the first
settle message */
then
117 PendingChannels(cid)← v
118 else
119 deposits←{deposit id∣∃amount, isSymmetric,x ∶
D(deposit id) = (amount, x, cid, isSymmetric)}
120 foreach (deposit id ∈ deposits):
D(deposit id)←⊥ /* remove all the deposits
associated with the channel */
121 C(cid)←⊥
122 PendingChannels(cid)←⊥
123 return (success, ledger payment id)
124 else
125 return (fail)
dissociateDeposit to FTeechain.
◦ dissociatedDepositAck When a user invokes his
FTEE with the message dissociatedDepositAck,
S invokes ackDissociate in the ideal world.
◦ pay When a user invokes pay to FTEE, S invokes pay
to FTeechain.
◦ paid Whenever a user passes paid to his FTEE, then
S calls receivePayment.
◦ settle Whenever a user invokes settle to his FTEE,
S invokes settleChannel commands on behalf of
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the user of the channel, i.e., for a channel be-
tween u and v them S will invoke settleChannelu
and settleChannelv with the channel id cid.
In H4 S can faithfully interact with FTeechain, while faith-
fully emulating A’s view of the real-world. S can then
output to E exactly A’s output in the real-world. Thus,
there does not exist any environment E that can distin-
guish between interaction with A and the Teechain chan-
nel protocol, from interaction with S and FTeechain.
Next, we define balance correctness in the ideal-world, and
prove that FTeechain captures it.
A.4 Balance Correctness in the Ideal-World
We proved that for any environment E the ideal-world and
the real-world executions are indistinguishable. Therefore,
we can define the security interest of a payment channel in
the ideal-world, and prove that the ideal-world execution
achieves this desired property. Since both the ideal and the
real world are indistinguishable to any environment, then both
the definition of balance correctness, and the proof that it
holds in the ideal-world will also hold in the real-world, thus
concluding the proof.
Notations and Definitions. We define our security goal to be
balance correctness. Intuitively, this means that at any point
in time, an honest user u can choose to settle a channel cid
with another user v, even if v is corrupt or crashes arbitrarily,
and receive her balance on the ledger without the ability of v
or any other user w to affect the outcome.
To formally discuss balance correctness we first define a
few notations and definitions:
An execution σ = (ev1,ev2, . . . ,evn) =((op1,ret1), (op2,ret2), . . . , (opn,retn)) is a series of events ev,
each consists of a call op to FTeechain and its return value from
FTeechain, ret. Each event might also result in the change of
the state, i.e., the internal variables maintained by FTeechain.
Lt (u) is the balance on the Ledger for user u at time t, i.e., if
any user v calls getLedgerBalancev(u) at time t, then Lt (u)
is the returned value.
The initial time 0 is a time in an execution in the ideal-
world prior to any calls to FTeechain, with some initial value
on the Ledger for the users in the run, e.g. users u,v,w with
some initial values L0(u), L0(v), L0(w) respectively. σt is the
prefix of the execution σ from time 0 to t.
We denote paymentst (u) be the set of all the amounts of
successful pay calls to FTeechain from u that returned success
during σt :
paymentst (u) = {amount∣
∃i,cid,v,amount,pending payment id ∶
evi ∈ σt ,opi = payu(cid,v,amount),
reti = (success,pending payment id)}
Let paidt (u) be the sum of all payments in paymentst (u),
i.e.,
paidt (u) =∑
amount∈paymentst (u)amount
We denote receivedPaymentst (u) to be a set of all the
amounts of successful receivePayment calls to FTeechain
from u that returned success during σt :
receivedPaymentst (u) = {amount∣
∃i,pending payment id,cid,amount ∶
evi ∈ σt ,opi = receivePaymentu(pending payment id),
∃ j < i,amount ∶ ev j ∈ σt ,op j = payu(cid,amount),
ret j = (success,pending payment id)}
Let receivedPaymentst (u) be the sum of all such received
payments in receivedPaymentst (u) , i.e.
rcvdt (u) =∑
amount∈receivedPaymentst (u)amount
We are now ready to define the perceived balance in the
ideal-world of user u.
Definition A.2 (Perceived Balance in the Ideal-World). The
perceived balance of user u at time t is defined as
perceivedBalt (u) = L0 (u)+ rcvdt (u)−paidt (u)
We are now ready to formally define balance correctness.
Definition A.3 (Balance Correctness). We say an algorithm
satisfies balance correctness if for any prefix σt for t ≥ 0, and
for any well-behaved user u in the system, u can preform a
series of operations, possibly interleaved with operations of
other users, that will be completed in a finite time t ′, after
which at any time t ′′ ≥ t ′: Lt ′′ (u) ≥ perceivedBalt (u).
A user u is honest or well-behaved if she follows the series
of operations of the algorithm. We note that definitions defini-
tion A.3 and definition A.1 are equal to the environment E as
the ideal-world and the real-world are indistinguishable to it.
Theorem A.1. [Balance Correctness Theorem] The ideal
functionality FTeechain achieves balance correctness.
In order to show that FTeechain achieves balance correctness
we need to show an algorithm, i.e., a series of operations
that an honest user u has to preform in order to receive her
perceived balance perceivedBalt (u).
We define the following sets, based on the internal variables
of FTeechain:
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1. All the deposit ids in D that are not currently associated
with any channel at time t:
innerDepositst (u) = {deposit id∣
∃deposit id, isSymmetric ∶
D(deposit id) = (amount,u,⊥, isSymmetric)}
2. All the channel ids that have not been settled yet until
time t. i.e.:
innerChannelst (u) =
= {cid∣∃cid,v,amountV, isSymmetric ∶
C(cid) = (u,v,amountU,amountV, isSymmetric)
∨C(cid) = (v,u,amountV,amountU, isSymmetric),
PendingChannels(cid) ≠ u}
3. All the ledger payment ids ledger payment id that are
associated with u and have not been placed on the ledger
yet:
innerPendingLedgerPaymentt (u) =
= {ledger payment id∣∃ledger payment id ∶
PendingLedgerPayments(ledger payment id) =(u,amount)}
In order for u to receive her perceived balance
perceivedBalt (u), we describe an algorithm, i.e., a series of
calls to FTeechain.
1. u places a set of remove operations for each deposit id ∈
innerDepositst (u):
OPS1 = {removeDepositu (deposit id) ∣
deposit id ∈ innerDepositst (u)}
Lemma 2. If u places the calls to FTeechain described in
OPS1, then the return value of each call is success with
some ledger payment id value ledger payment id.
Proof. The if statement in the removeDeposit al-
gorithm (Alg. 6, Line 31) will be true for any
deposit id deposit id ∈ innerDepositst (u), which
means that FTeechain will create a new ledger pay-
ment id ledger payment id and return success with
ledger payment id (Line 35).
Lemma 3. User u has all the deposit ids
deposit id ∈ innerDepositst (u), such that she has the
ability to invoke all the calls in OPS1.
Proof. OPS1 is defined on a set of deposit ids deposit id
such that there exists the entry D(deposit id) =(amount,u,⊥, isSymmetric). The only option for
such an entry to be generated, is if during σt
addDepositu(amount) was invoked by u. When
the call returns successfully, FTeechain returns(success, ledger payment id) to u. Thus, at time t, u al-
ready has all the deposit ids she needs in order to invoke
the removeDeposit calls in OPS1.
2. u places a set of settle operations for each channel id
cid ∈ innerChannelst (u):
OPS2 = {settleu (cid) ∣cid ∈ innerChannelst (u)}
Lemma 4. If u places the calls to FTeechain described in
OPS2, then the return value of each call is success with
some ledger payment id value ledger payment id.
Proof. The if statement of the settleChannel algo-
rithm (Alg. 6, Line 108) will be true for any cid in
innerChannelst (u), thus FTeechain will return success
with a ledger id ledger payment id (Line 123).
Lemma 5. User u has all the channel ids
cid ∈ innerChannelst (u) such that she can invoke all the
settleChannel calls in OPS2.
Proof. OPS2 is defined as settleChannel calls for
channel ids cid such that C(cid) exists with user u.
The only option for such an entry to be generated is
if u invoked openChannelu(cid) during σt or invoked
acceptChannelOpenu(cid). Thus, at time t, u has
all the channels ids she needs in order to invoke the
settleChannel calls as defined in OPS2.
We proved that if u places the calls to FTeechain described
in OPS1 and in OPS2, then the return value of all these
calls is (success, ledger payment id).
We denote by t1 the time in which all the calls in OPS1∪
OPS2 return successfully.
Let us define a set of the return values for each operation
in OPS1 ∪OPS2 at t1:
RET = {ledger payment id∣
∃i ∶ evi = (opi,reti) ∈ σt1 ,opi ∈ OPS1 ∪OPS2,
reti = (success, ledger payment id)}
3. u places a set of acceptLedgerPayment op-
erations for each ledger payment id ∈ RET ∪
innerPendingLedgerPaymentt (u):
OPS3 = {acceptLedgerPaymentu(ledger payment id)∣
ledger payment id ∈ RET∪
innerPendingLedgerPaymentt (u)}
Lemma 6. If u places the calls described in OPS3 then
FTeechain returns success for each of them.
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Proof. All the pending payment ids of the calls
described in OPS3 are in PendingPayments as
proved in Lemma 2 and Lemma 4, thus when u
places acceptLedgerPayment with those pending
pending payment id, FTeechain will return success.
Definition A.4 (balance correctness algorithm). The suffix
for u in order to receive perceivedBalt (u) in the prefix σt is:
OPSu ≜ (OPS1,OPS2,OPS3)
We now move to show that by invoking the calls in Defi-
nition A.4, any user can receive her perceived balance, thus
proving Theorem A.1.
Let innerChannelBalancet (u) be the set of all the capacities
of all the open channels user u has with other users in the
system at a given time t:
innerChannelBalancet (u) = {amountU∣
∃cid,v,amountV, isSymmetric ∶(C(cid) = (u,v,amountU,amountV, isSymmetric)
∨C(cid) = (v,u,amountV,amountU, isSymmetric)),
PendingChannels(cid) ≠ u}
Let innerChannelBalanceSumt (u) be the sum of all the ca-
pacities in innerChannelBalancet (u):
innerChannelBalanceSumt (u) =∑
amount∈innerChannelBalancet (u)amount
Let innerDepositBalancet (u) be the set of the amounts of
deposits that user u added and not removed, and are not
associated with any channel at a given time t, i.e.:
innerDepositBalancet (u) = {amount∣
∃deposit id, isSymmetric ∶
D(deposit id) = (amount,u,⊥, isSymmetric)}
Let innerDepositBalanceSumt (u) be the sum of all
amounts in innerDepositBalancet (u):
innerDepositBalanceSumt (u) =∑
amount∈innerDepositBalancet (u)amount
Let innerPendingLedgerOpsSumt (u) be a set of all pending
ledger operations from user u at a given time t, i.e.:
innerPendingLedgerOpsSumt (u) =
= {amount∣∃ledger payment id ∶
PendingLedgerPayments(ledger payment id)= (u,amount)}
Let innerPendingLedgerOpsSumt (u) be the sum of
all the amount of the ledger payment operations in
innerPendingLedgerOpsSumt (u):
innerPendingLedgerOpsSumt (u) =∑
amount∈innerPendingLedgerOpsSumt (u)amount
Let innerPendingDepositst (u) be a set of all amounts of
deposits in the process of being dissociated from a channel,
i.e., all deposits in PendingDeposits:
innerPendingDepositst (u) =
= {amount∣∃deposit id,cid, isSymmetric ∶
PendingDeposits(deposit id) = (u, isSymmetric),
D(deposit id) = (amount,u,cid, isSymmetric)}
Let innerPendingDepositsSumt (u) be the sum of all the
amounts of pending deposits in innerPendingDepositst (u):
innerPendingDepositsSumt (u) =∑
amount∈innerPendingDepositsSumt (u)amount
Definition A.5. Let stateBalancet (u) be the balance of u, as
defined by the internal state of FTeechain at a given time t, i.e.:
stateBalancet (u) = Lt (u)+ innerChannelBalanceSumt (u)+
+ innerDepositBalanceSumt (u)+
+ innerPendingLedgerOpsSumt (u)+
+ innerPendingDepositsSumt (u)
We begin by showing, that at any given time t the state
balance of u is the same as the perceived balance as defined
in Definition A.2.
Proposition 1. At any execution σ the inner balance of u
and the perceived balances are equal, i.e.:
perceivedBalt (u) = stateBalancet (u)
Proof. We will prove this by induction on the execution σ .
Inductive base. In the beginning of the execution σ at t =
0 all the internal variables of FTeechain are ⊥, i.e., for any
internal variable f of FTeechain, and for any x: f (x) =⊥. Thus:
innerChannelBalance0(u) = ∅
innerDepositBalance0(u) = ∅
innerPendingLedgerOpsSum0(u) = ∅
innerPendingDepositsSum0(u) = ∅
Which means that:
innerChannelBalanceSum0(u) = 0
innerDepositBalanceSum0(u) = 0
innerPendingLedgerOpsSum0(u) = 0
innerPendingDepositsSum0(u) = 0
And: stateBalance0(u) = perceivedBal0(u)
Inductive step. Let us assume that in step i < t:
stateBalancei(u) = perceivedBali(u). We show that af-
ter the next event at step i + 1: stateBalancei+1(u) =
perceivedBali+1(u).
First we note that the inner balance as defined above does
not change if FTeechain returns fail for any call, as the if state-
ment in the beginning of each of its calls will cause it to return
fail and change nothing, and in particular, not change Li (u).
We go over all the event types, each of them a result of a
call to FTeechain, and show that for each of them, under the
induction assumption for step i, it also holds for step i+1, i.e.:
23
stateBalancei+1(u) = perceivedBali+1(u)
• getLedgerBalance This algorithm does not affect any
variable of FTeechain.
• acceptLedgerPayment This algorithm takes
amount from PendingLedgerPayments at time
i and adds it to Li+1 (u), then it removes
PendingLedgerPayments(ledger payment id), i.e.:
innerPendingLedgerOpsSumi+1(u) =
innerPendingLedgerOpsSumi(u)−amount
Li+1 (u) = Li (u)+amount
stateBalancei(u) = stateBalancei+1(u) =
= perceivedBali(u) = perceivedBali+1(u)
• addDeposit This algorithm deducts amount from Li (u)
and adds an entry D(depositEntry) with amount, i.e.:
innerDepositBalanceSumi+1(u) =
= innerDepositBalanceSumi(u)+amount
Li+1 (u) = Li (u)−amount
stateBalancei(u) = stateBalancei+1(u) =
= perceivedBali(u) = perceivedBali+1(u)
• removeDeposit This algorithm removes
D(deposit id) and adds amount to
PendingLedgerPayments(ledger payment id), i.e.:
innerPendingLedgerOpsSumi+1(u) =
= innerPendingLedgerOpsSumi(u)+amount
innerDepositBalanceSumi+1(u) =
= innerDepositBalanceSumi(u)−amount
stateBalancei(u) = stateBalancei+1(u) =
= perceivedBali(u) = perceivedBali+1(u)
• openChannel This algorithm does not affect the inner
balance and therefore at step i+1 the inner and perceived
balances are the same as in step i.
• acceptChannelOpen This algorithm does not affect the
inner balance and therefore at step i+ 1 the inner and
perceived balances are the same as in step i.
• associateDeposit This algorithm changes the third argu-
ment of D(deposit id) to cid, which logically means that
the deposit deposit id is now associated with channel cid.
By doing so, it moves amount
from innerDepositBalanceSumi(u) to
innerChannelBalanceSumi+1(u), i.e.:
innerDepositBalanceSumi+1(u) =
= innerDepositBalanceSumi(u)−amount
innerChannelBalanceSumi+1(u) =
= innerChannelBalanceSumi(u)+amount
stateBalancei(u) = stateBalancei+1(u) =
= perceivedBali(u) = perceivedBali+1(u)
• acceptAssociateDeposit This algorithm does not af-
fect the inner balance and therefore at step i+1 the in-
ner and perceived balances are the same as in step i.
• dissociateDeposit This algorithm deducts amount from
the balance of u at time i in channel cid and adds it to
PendingDeposits(deposit id) at i+1, i.e.:
innerChannelBalanceSumi+1(u) =
= innerChannelBalanceSumi(u)−amount
innerPendingDepositsSumi+1(u) =
= innerPendingDepositsSumi(u)+amount
stateBalancei(u) = stateBalancei+1(u) =
= perceivedBali(u) = perceivedBali+1(u)
• acceptDissociate This algorithm does not affect the in-
ner balance and therefore at step i+1 the inner and per-
ceived balances are the same as in step i.
• ackDissociate This algorithm removes the entry
PendingDeposits(deposit id) and changes the third argu-
ment of D(deposit id) to ⊥, which logically means that
the deposit is not associated with any channel:
innerPendingDepositsSumi+1(u) =
= innerPendingDepositsSumi(u)−amount
innerDepositBalanceSumi+1(u) =
= innerDepositBalanceSumi(u)+amount
stateBalancei(u) = stateBalancei+1(u) =
= perceivedBali(u) = perceivedBali+1(u)
• pay This algorithm deducts amount from the balance of u
in channel cid at time i, thus changing stateBalancei(u),
but it also deducts amount from perceivedBali(u), i.e.:
innerChannelBalanceSumi+1(u) =
= innerChannelBalanceSumi(u)−amount
paidi+1(u) = paidi(u)−amount
stateBalancei(u) = stateBalancei+1(u) =
= perceivedBali(u) = perceivedBali+1(u)
• receivePayment This algorithm adds amount to the
balance of u in channel cid at time i, thus chang-
ing stateBalancei(u), but it also adds amount to
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perceivedBali(u), i.e.:
innerChannelBalanceSumi+1(u) =
= innerChannelBalanceSumi(u)+amount
rcvdi+1(u) = rcvdi(u)+amount
stateBalancei(u) = stateBalancei+1(u) =
= perceivedBali(u) = perceivedBali+1(u)
• settleChannel This algorithm takes the current balance
of u in channel cid, and the sum of the deposits in the
process of dissociation and deducts the total amount
from u ands it as a pending ledger operation, i.e.:
innerChannelBalancei+1(u) = 0
innerPendingDepositsSumi+1(u) = 0
innerPendingLedgerOpsSumi+1(u) =
= innerPendingLedgerOpsSumi(u)+
+ innerChannelBalanceSumi(u)+
+ innerPendingDepositsSumi(u)
stateBalancei(u) = stateBalancei+1(u) =
= perceivedBali(u) = perceivedBali+1(u)
This concludes the inductive step, we proved that
stateBalancet (u) = perceivedBalt (u) for any time t during the
execution σ .
Next we show that for any open channel cid the sum of the
balances on both sides of the channel is less or equal to the
sum of the deposits associated with the channel.
We first denote by depositst (u) all the deposits that at a
given time t are associated with a given channel cid:
depositst (u) = {amount∣∃deposit id, isSymmetric,u ∶
D(deposit id) = (amount,u,cid, isSymetric),
PendingDeposits(deposit id) =⊥}
We denote by depositsSumt (cid) the sum of the amounts of
the deposits that are associated at a given time t with channel
cid:
depositsSumt (cid) =∑
amount∈depositst (u)amount
We denote by channelCapacityt (cid) the sum of the capaci-
ties of the two users u and v which have a channel between
them with channel id cid at time t, i.e., for channel entry
C(cid) = (u,v,amountU,amountV, isSymmetric) we denote:
channelCapacityt (cid) = amountU+amountV
Proposition 2. At any given time t during the execution σ
the sum of the deposits associated with a given channel cid is
always greater or equal to the balances of both users of the
channel u and v, i.e.:
channelCapacityt (cid) ≤ depositsSumt (cid) (1)
Proof. We will prove this by induction on the execution σ :
Inductive base. At the initial step 0: ∀cid ∶C(cid) =⊥. There-
fore, there are no open channels in system at all.
Inductive step. We assume that at step i the induction as-
sumption holds for all entries in C, i.e.,
channelCapacity0(cid) ≤ depositsSum0(cid).
We will prove that at step i+1 the proposition holds as well.
Let us look at all the operations in FTeechain. We note
that the channel balance as defined above does not change
if FTeechain returns fail for any call, as the if statement in the
beginning of each of its calls will cause it to return fail does
not change any internal variable of FTeechain. Thus, we go
over all operations that return success:
• getLedgerBalance This call does not affect the balance
of any channel in C.
• acceptLedgerPayment This call does not affect the bal-
ance of any channel in C.
• acceptLedgerPayment This call does not affect the bal-
ance of any channel in C.
• addDeposit This call does not affect the balance of any
channel in C.
• removeDeposit This call does not affect the balance of
any channel in C.
• openChannel In this call a new channel entry in C(cid) is
generated in the form of (u,v,0,0,⊥). Thus, no deposit
is associated at step i with channel cid, which means that
depositsSumi+1(cid) = channelCapacityi+1(cid) = 0.
• acceptChannelOpen The only effect of this call on
C(cid) is that it changes the last argument of the entry
C(cid) from ⊥ to ⊤. This means that if at step i ?? holds
then it also holds at step i+1.
• associateDeposit In any successful call
associateDeposit(cid,deposit id), FTeechain adds
the deposit amount to either amountU or
amountV, and changes the third argument of
D(deposit id) to cid, i.e., at step i + 1: the amount
of deposit id will be in depositsi+1(u) , and
depositsSumi+1(cid) = depositsSumi(cid) + amount and
channelCapacityi+1(cid) = channelCapacityi(cid) +
amount ⇒ channelCapacityi+1(cid) ≤
depositsSumi+1(cid).
• acceptAssociateDeposit This call does not affect the
balance of any channel in C as it only changes the last
argument of D(deposit id) from ⊥ to ⊤.
• dissociateDeposit In this case amount is de-
ducted from either amountU or amountV, and
PendingDeposits(deposit id) entry is generated, i.e.,
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depositsSumi+1(cid) = depositsSumi(cid) − amount and
channelCapacityi+1(cid) = channelCapacityi(cid) −
amount ⇒ channelCapacityi+1(cid) ≤
depositsSumi+1(cid).
• acceptDissociate This algorithm only changes
PendingDeposits(deposit id) = (u,⊥) to (u,⊤) and does
not affect the balance of any channel in C.
• ackDissociate This algorithm removes
PendingDeposits(deposit id) and also changes the third
argument of D(deposit id) to ⊥, thus the deposit was
not in depositsi(u) at step i and is not in depositsi+1(u)
at step i+1.
• pay This call deducts amount from either amountU
or amountV in C(cid). In addition, in this
call FTeechain adds a new entry to PendingPay-
ments with a new generated pending payment id,
i.e., PendingPayments(pending payment id) =(v,cid,amount. This means that
channelCapacityi+1(cid) = channelCapacityi(cid) −
amount, depositsi+1(u) = depositsi(u) ⇒
channelCapacityi+1(cid) < depositsi+1(u)
• receivePayment In this call, FTeechain adds the
amount in PendingPayments(pending payment id) to
amountU or amountV in C(cid), and then removes
PendingPayments(pending payment id).
In order for the call receivePayment to return
success, there has to be at step i an entry
PendingPayments(pending payment id) in the form of(v,cid,amount). The only call in which FTeechain adds a
new entry to PendingPayments is pay. This pay call
needs to be called by either one of the parties in channel
cid and amount is deducted in that call from amountU or
amountV.
In addition, no other call deducts amount only
from the right hand side of ??, which means that,
channelCapacityi(cid) + amount ≤ depositsSumi(cid),
channelCapacityi+1(cid) = channelCapacityi(cid) +
amount ⇒ channelCapacityi+1(cid) ≤
depositsSumi+1(cid).
• settleChannel This calls settles the channel cid, and can
be called twice:
• If this is the second time settleChannel
is called, then C(cid) is removed, thus
channelCapacityi+1(cid) is undefined at i+1.
• If this is the first call to settleChannel, then after
the calls ends at step i+ 1, C(cid) is updated s.t.
amountU = 0.
In addition, all the deposits
s.t. ∃deposit id, isSymmetric ∶
PendingDeposits(deposit id) = (u, isSymmetric)
are removed from D. The only deposits which
have an entry in PendingDeposits are deposits with
deposit id s.t. dissociateDepositu(deposit id)
was called during σi, i.e., amount was already de-
ducted from channelCapacityi(cid) .
This means that channelCapacityi+1(cid) =
channelCapacityi(cid) − amountU = amountV,
depositsSumi+1(cid) = depositsSumi(cid), thus,
channelCapacityi+1(cid) ≤ depositsSumi+1(cid).
Finally, we prove that at any given time t, any user u has
the ability to receive stateBalancet (u) by preforming the op-
erations of the balance algorithm A.4.
Proposition 3. If a user u preforms the operations described
in balance correctness algorithm A.4 as a suffix to the pre-
fix σt , interleaved with operation of other users, then for
any time t ′′ ≥ t ′ such that opt ′′ = getLedgerBalance(u) and
rett ′′ = (success, amount), then amount = stateBalancet (u).
Proof. Let us look at the for sets of operations con-
sisting the balance correctness algorithm (definition A.4):
OPSu = (OPS1,OPS2,OPS3).
• innerDepositBalancet (u) Let us look at OPS1.
This set consists of removeDepositu calls to
FTeechain for each deposit id ∈ innerDepositst (u).
innerDepositBalanceSumt (u) is defined as the sum of
all those deposits. We proved in Lemma 2 that FTeechain
returns (success, ledger payment id) for all these calls,
and for each call adds the deposit amount amount to
PendingLedgerPayments(deposit id). This means that
at time t1 when all calls in OPS1 have been called then:
innerDepositBalanceSumt1 (u) = 0
innerPendingLedgerOpsSumt1 (u) =
= innerPendingLedgerOpsSumt (u)+
+ innerDepositBalanceSumt (u)
• innerChannelBalancet (u), innerPendingDepositst (u)
Let us look at OPS2. This set consists of
settleChannelu(cid) calls for each channel cid ∈
innerChannelst (u). innerChannelBalanceSumt (u) is de-
fined as the sum of all u’s open channels’ balances,
and innerPendingDepositst (u) is defined as all the
deposits in the process of dissociation from a chan-
nel. We proved in Lemma 4 that FTeechain returns(success, ledger payment id) for all these calls, and
for each call adds u’s channel balance amountU to
PendingPayments(deposit id).
In addition OPS2 does not change any existing en-
tries in PendingLedgerPayments, therefore not changing
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innerPendingLedgerOpsSumt1 (u). Thus, at time t2 when
all calls in OPS2 have been completed:
innerChannelBalanceSumt2 (u) =
= innerPendingDepositsSumt2 (u) = 0
innerPendingLedgerOpsSumt2 (u) =
= innerPendingLedgerOpsSumt1 (u)+
+ innerChannelBalanceSumt (u)+
+ innerPendingDepositsSumt (u)
• innerPendingLedgerOpsSumt (u) This set consists of
acceptLedgerPaymentu for each ledger payment ids
ledger payment id that were the return values of the
operations in OPS1 ∪ OPS2 in addition to all pend-
ing ledger operatios in innerPendingLedgerPaymentt (u).
This means that at a time t3 when the calls in OPS3 fin-
ish successfully (as proved in lemma 6):
innerPendingLedgerOpsSumt3 (u) =
= innerPendingLedgerOpsSumt2 (u)−
− innerChannelBalanceSumt (u)−
− innerDepositBalanceSumt (u) = 0
Lt3 (u) = Lt (u)+
+ innerChannelBalanceSumt (u)+
+ innerDepositBalanceSumt (u)+
+ innerPendingDepositsSumt (u)+
+ innerPendingLedgerOpsSumt (u)
We note that t3 is the time after all the opera-
tions in OPSu have been invoked and returned success-
fully, and that Lt3 (u) = stateBalancet (u). Therefore, if
any user calls getLedgerBalance(u), FTeechain will return(success,amount) such that amount = stateBalancet (u).
We proved that at any point in time a user u can preform a
series of calls to FTeechain and receive her inner balance. Since
the inner balance is always equal to u’s perceived balance and
we showed that the ability of u to preform these operations fo
not affect the perceived balance of other users in the system
then any user can choose to preform these operations and
receive their balance.
We recall Theorem A.1:
[Balance Correctness Theorem] The ideal functionality
FTeechain achieves balance correctness.
This concludes our proof to the theorem, and since the
ideal-world and the real-world are indistinguishable to any
external environment E then Teechain achieves balance cor-
rectness.
A.5 Multi-hop payments
Here we show that multi-hop payments satisfy balance cor-
rectness. As long as a multi-hop payment is not completed,
the perceived balance of a user might be either post-payment
or pre-payment (see §5). Thus, we define the perceived bal-
ance of a user in a multi-hop payment between u and v,
where u is routing a payment of amount to v. For execution
trace σ let: t1 be the time in σ at which u enters stage lock of
the protocol; t2 > t1 be the time in σ at which v enters stage
lock; t3 > t2 the time in σ at which v enters stage idle; and
t4 > t3 the time in σ at which u ends the protocol and enters
stage idle. See Fig. 2.
The users’ perceived balances are as follows: For u, the
perceived balance is: before t1 as if amount was not paid; af-
ter t4 as if amount was paid; between t1 and t4 either option
is acceptable. For v, the perceived balance is: before t2 as
if amount was not paid; after t3 as if amount was paid; be-
tween t2 and t3 either option is acceptable. The perceived bal-
ance of any intermediate party in the multi-hop payment does
not change.
We prove Theorem A.1 by showing that every node p
in a multi-hop payment (including u and v) can unilaterally
reclaim their perceived balance at any point in time. We
further show that if p settles, then all the channels of the multi-
hop payment will always consistently settle the in either the
pre-payment or post-payment state. Note that single channel
payments do not interfere with multi-hop payments, as all the
channels in the multi-hop payment are locked (§5).
Stage: idle. If p is in stage idle, then all other nodes of
the payment are either in stage idle or lock. Node p and
all other nodes can only obtain the pre-payment settlement
transaction and subsequently stop the protocol. In this stage,
the perceived balance of both u and v reflects the pre-payment
state, thus satisfying balance correctness.
Stage: lock. If p is in stage lock, all other nodes are either
(i) in stage idle and in stage lock, or (ii) in stage lock and in
stage sign. All nodes can only settle their channels at the pre-
payment state.
Stage: sign. If p is in stage sign, all nodes are either (i) in
stage lock and in stage sign, or (ii) in stage sign and in stage
preUpdate. Case (i): If any node ejects, it settles its channels
in the pre-payment state. This prevents progress and no node
will reach the preUpdate stage. Node p can then similarly
eject and settle its channels in the pre-payment state. Case
(ii): Any node in the preUpdate stage might eject with τ . In
this case, all channels will be settled in post-payment state.
Stage: preUpdate. If p is in stage preUpdate, all nodes are
either (i) in stage sign and in stage preUpdate, or (ii) in stage
preUpdate and in stage update. Case (i): Any node in stage
sign may eject and settle its channels in the pre-payment state.
Node p can then present this settlement transaction to its TEE
as PoPT and obtain pre-payment settlement transactions for
its channels. Node p can also voluntarily eject and obtain
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τ . Placing τ onto the blockchain fails if one of the channels
was already settled, in which case p can obtain settlement
transactions for its channels as above. Case (ii): Any node can
eject and settle the multi-hop payment with τ . If nodes have
reached update, then all nodes passed stage sign, therefore
none can generate local settlements.
Stage: update. If p is in stage update, all nodes are either
(i) in stage preUpdate and in stage update, or (ii) in stage
update and in stage postUpdate. Case (i): All nodes can
eject and settle the multi-hop payment with τ . None can gen-
erate individual settlements. Case (ii): Nodes in postUpdate
can only settle their channels individually at post-payment
state. Node p can present its TEE with single-channel set-
tling transactions as PoPT and obtain settlement transactions
to terminate in post-update state.
Stage: postUpdate. If p is in stage postUpdate, all nodes
are either (i) in stage update and in stage postUpdate, or
(ii) in stage postUpdate and in stage idle. Case (i): Nodes
in the update stage can voluntarily settle the entire multi-
hop payment with τ . Nodes in stage postUpdate can settle
their local channels at post-payment, and provide node p with
PoPT to do the same. Case (ii): All nodes can only settle
their local channels at post-payment.
Stage: release. When p returns to the release stage, other
nodes are either in release, or some are in stage update; all
nodes can only settle their channels at the post-payment state.
With this, we conclude that Teechains multi-hop payment
satisfy balance correctness: (i) if either u or v are in the ini-
tial idle stage, they are both only able to settle pre-payment;
(ii) between stage lock and postUpdate, both u and v may
settle their channels in either pre-payment or post-payment
state. However, they will always consistently settle the same
state; (iii) once reaching stage release, both u and v will set-
tle the post-payment state. The balance for any intermediate
nodes does not change during the course of the payment rout-
ing. Thus, all participants in the multi-hop payment protocol
are always able to reclaim their perceived balance.
This concludes our proof. We proved theorem A.1 and
showed that the Teechain protocol (both channel and multi-
hop payments) guarantee balance correctness.
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